Reducing the reliance of traditional fuels in informal settlements

The pilot of a community kitchen in Portee-Rokupa, Freetown, Sierra Leone

There is political controversary around the total population of Freetown, Sierra Leone. The 2021 mid-term Population and Housing census noted a significant decrease in Freetown’s population which has subsequently been challenged by the mayor and other leading stakeholders. Statistics vary from 600,000 to 1.35million. Regardless, it is estimated that 36% of the city’s population live within densely populated informal settlements scattered across Freetown’s eastern peninsula. These communities, not too dissimilar to other low-income settlements across the city, and indeed other densely populated urban centres, are often located in geographically vulnerable areas and prone to increased hazards, risks and disasters.

It is in the informal settlement of Portee Rokupa where researchers from the University of Bristol have been working since 2021 (Figure 1). The ESRC funded ‘Beyond the Networked City’ project (grant number:  ES/T007656/1) is a collaboration between the University of Bristol, Loughborough University, Sierra Leone Urban Research Centre (SLURC), Makerere University, and the University of Cape Town that seeks to further understand urban service delivery of key infrastructure such as water, sanitation and energy in Freetown and Kampala. In close partnership with SLURC, over 360 households in Portee Rokupa were surveyed on their energy services such as electricity and cooking.

Map of Portee Rokupa, Freetown
Figure 1: Map of Portee Rokupa, Freetown

In Portee Rokupa, like most of these communities, their residents, mainly women and young girls, carry out the daily task of cooking. Cooking, whether for personal consumption or income generating purposes, is usually prepared using traditional biomass fuels such as charcoal with basic, inefficient metal stoves called coal pots (Figure 2). The use of traditional coal pot stoves are contributors to air pollution and environmental degradation affecting health of users and local forest cover.

A stereotypical charcoal coal pot used in Freetown
Figure 2: A stereotypical charcoal coal pot used in Freetown

Working closely with the residents and community actors in Portee Rokupa, there is an overwhelming desire to transition to cleaner cooking solutions, but there are challenges around accessibility, availability, finance, and imposed knowledge that hinders the sustainable uptake of ‘clean’ cookstoves. Whilst trying to further understand what could be done to improve their cooking service delivery, the idea for a communal cooking space, which offers a range of cooking technologies, to be used on a pay-as-you basis, was both desirable and aspirational for the community.

SLURC project managed the community kitchen project whilst also facilitating community dialogue to ensure that residents themselves were part of the design and construction, and management of the kitchen. They also fostered new and existing partnerships with key stakeholders including the Government Technical Institute (GTI), the Electricity Generation and Transmission Company (EGTC), and Afrigas, a national LPG supplier. What started as ad-hoc discussions around the need to improve cooking service delivery within informal settlements, turned into the creation of the Platform for Energy Safety, innovation, and Access Consortium (PESIA), a call to action for stakeholders to further understand the cooking needs of residents living in informal settlements.

To ensure long-term sustainability of the kitchen, community members were selected to become community Energy Champions and were trained by the above stakeholders on the use, maintenance, finance and safety of different cooking technologies that would enable them to provide tailored support in the community kitchen as well as broader advice around energy choices within the community. The community were involved at every stage of the project from kitchen design, choice of location, selection of preferred stoves and fuels as well as overall kitchen management. For example, because Portee Rokupa is predominantly a fishing community, the desire for larger stoves and ovens that would help smoke, preserve and process fish was something residents regularly communicated. The community kitchen does not only provide access to improved cooking facilities, but also serves as a hub for broader community interaction, something that is of importance to the community.

Training of Energy Champions
Figure 3: Training of Energy Champions

So, what has the Community Kitchen achieved? Since it’s official launch in May 2024 (Figure 4), the pilot has received significant attention within Freetown, especially on social media channels and within local news outlets. Management of the kitchen has been fully handed over to the community and energy champions who have elected a chairwoman and a chairman who will oversee the use of the kitchen and be responsible for financial accountability. Residents of Portee Rokupa are now regularly using the kitchen facilities, not only for their mealtime cooking, but for community events such as parties and weddings, and local entrepreneurs are using the kitchen for productive uses such as food preparation, fish smoking and soap making.

The broader impact of this initiative extends beyond the immediate benefits of access to cleaner, more efficient cooking solutions. The kitchen is now an official vendor of Afrigas bottles, bringing a consistent supply of LPG to the community for the first time. Community buy-in, consistent dialogue, co-creation of kitchen design and the training of energy champions has fostered a sense of ownership and responsibility, encouraging them to advocate for and implement sustainable practices within their communities. This grassroots approach has also extended into other informal communities such as Susan’s Bay and Dwazark where energy champions are spreading their knowledge to ensure households are more aware of different cooking options available rather than solely relying on traditional ways of cooking. The Portee-Rokupa community kitchen was a pilot initiative driven by a community desire to have access to alternative cooking services. It is now forging its way as a beacon of knowledge, empowerment and sustainability. It demonstrates how targeted training and community engagement can drive significant changes, paving the way for a more sustainable and resilient future for all. As these Energy Champions continue their work, they are not just transforming kitchens; they are transforming lives and building a brighter, greener future for their communities.

Cooking in the community kitchen
Figure 4: Cooking in the community kitchen on launch day, May 2024

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This blog is written by Amadu Kamara Labor and Dora Vangahun from Sierra Leone Urban Research Centre, Freetown, Sierra Leone; and Charlotte Ray and Sam Williamson from the School of Electrical, Electronic and Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Energy Management Research Group, University of Bristol.

The background research behind this work was funded by the ESRC through grant ES/T007656/1, Beyond the Networked City: Building innovative delivery systems for water, sanitation and energy in urban Africa. The Community Kitchen was funded by a joint EPSRC/ESRC Impact Acceleration Account Award, grant numbers EP/X525674/1 ES/X004392/1.

Breaking down ‘the beef’: Unpacking British animal farmers’ attitudes towards veganism

In recent years, plant-based diets have spiked across the UK. These trends are accompanied by increased discussions about consumption choices, in which vegans and livestock farmers are often depicted as rivals in a highly polarised public debate. Debates often centre on the modern meat industry, predominately criticised for its exploitative animal husbandry and/or its unsustainable farming practices. As livestock farmers’ activities are placed under the microscope, are their reputations falling in respectability?

Attempts have been made to improve communication between farmers and consumers, addressing a so called urban-rural ‘disconnect’. The thought goes that when communication is poor between these parties, polarization and stereotypes are given greater space to thrive. This issue became the springboard for my project. As veganism’s objections to animal farming are well-documented, I wanted to hear more from UK farmers’ themselves about their relatively unheard views on veganism.

Research realities

The nature of this study called for qualitative research: semi-structured interviews aiming to gain detailed, ‘close-up’ information on farmers’ lived experiences. With resources limited, my participants comprised of 12 British meat and dairy farmers, allowing me to explore sheep, cattle and pig farms of different shapes-and-sizes.

Although UK farming communities are recognised as an especially hard-to-reach demographic for research engagement, I was able to utilize my ‘insider’ status to secure a high response rate. Whilst I am from a farming background, I am also a vegetarian: an ‘outsider’ dietary choice that is frequently met with negativity in the agricultural world.

 

Spatial distribution of interviewees across the UK
Spatial distribution of interviewees across the UK

Farmers’ ‘issues’

The livestock farmers I interviewed expressed two broad issues with veganism. The first issue spoke of the ‘urban disconnect’ from everyday, rural cultures and lifestyles on the farm. Farmers cast vegans as estranged ‘city people’ who therefore create misconceptions about farming practices. Speaking of artificial insemination, one farmer with a micro-dairy explained that animal rights activists are “just totally wrong” by commonly naming AI as “raping a cow”. He named these claims as an “anthropocentrism […] [The cows are] not in any distress with it […] The idea that it goes against the will of the cow is just incorrect” (Farmer J).

Farmers also saw veganism’s disconnection from the realities of livestock farming as leaving no scope for there to be any positive kind of relationships between farmer and animal. Things like

sheep running through the field […] the farmer helping a ewe give birth […] The kind of joyful sides of it […] If a farmer says: ‘but no, there’s a relationship and it’s like a symbiotic thing’, it’s like ‘fuck off is it symbiotic, it’s the most exploitative relationship possible’ (Mixed livestock farmer).

In general, farmers spoke of complicated and intimate farmer-animal relationships. Whilst acknowledging that livestock are kept for economic purposes, they felt that animals can equally shape ways of being in the world for farmers. They believed that most vegans failed to recognise this, only having the scope to consider the worst bits of livestock farming. In other words, they see “the end product, and the end product is death”.

Secondly, many farmers problematised veganism as an unsuitable paradigm for UK agriculture to holistically follow:

I think that veganism is still just as dependent on the worst bits of our food system, as in the agro chemistries […] I think it’s just as dependent on all of these, but it has falsely blamed animals as the consequence of the environmental degradation (Sheep farmer).

Situated in the no-meat/pro-meat debate, many farmers I spoke with joined the rising number of people championing small-scale, naturalistic animal farming. Contrary to veganism, they saw livestock — extensively managed — as necessary for any healthy, farmed ecosystem. This mirrors one micro-dairy farmers’ discussion on the reintegration of livestock onto degraded arable land:

There could be a really important role for livestock on repairing arable lands that could also help with transitioning away from artificial fertilizers and heavy use of fossil fuels in arable.

Overall, farmers critiqued veganism for failing to recognise the damage that conventional farming practices elicit, whilst promoting a singularly negative view of animal farming. They named the movement responsible for the successful “demonizing of cows”, claiming instead that it’s not the cow, it’s the how.

A less politically charged takeaway, however, is the idea that the UK’s fundamentally unsustainable food system is not being challenged by veganism. Farmers spoke about the need to reform the UK’s import-culture, in which only 55% of our food is home-grown. One believed that an ethical diet can’t be based on “unjust global structures either” as, for example, “problems [are] being caused for Mexican people by [the UK] importing so many avocados”.

Farmers felt that veganism falsely implies that ‘the food system is fine, just as long as customers do the correct thing and don’t eat animal produce’. Instead, many prefer to aspire towards a system that they felt does address deeper food system issues, such as a ‘farm-gate to plate’ model of local, agroecologically produced food.

Livestock farmers praise veganism

However, to focus solely on livestock farmers’ issues with veganism would paint a false image of what was said. Most farmers interviewed defended certain aspects of veganism, with a minority actively praising the movement:

So, where I think they do [understand the realities of livestock farming] is the […] refusal to look away from the bad aspects, from the dirtier aspects or the bloodier aspects of livestock farming […] I think a lot of meat-eaters just totally disavow that as if it doesn’t exist […] So I think vegans understand sometimes the realities of eating meat more than meat-eaters (Sheep farmer).

Here, this farmer approved of veganism for encouraging animal welfare debates. This reveals veganism’s potentially positive role in farmers’ eyes, overcoming some of the romantic ignorance about primary food production that persists in the UK. These welfare discussions often led to farmers passionately claiming that, as a nation, we need to drastically reduce our meat consumption, naming it “quite frightening” that meat consumption continues to rise “even with the vegan movement”.

Unlike existing narratives — casting vegans and livestock farmers as opposites — many farmers in my study sympathised with veganism’s goals. When discussing vegans’ decisions to eschew animal produce, one sheep farmer even said: “I totally get it and I certainly get the point where I don’t want to kill it because it’s beautiful”. These results reveal novel connections between two seemingly polarised groups. One mixed-livestock farmer even claimed that “for people to make a stance and make a decision, I applaud that”.

Farmers’ perspectives will always be diverse and complex. Nonetheless, there was a strong sense that many farmers are feeling that, within the realm of consumption, ignorance may just lie in focusing too much on what we eat, and not enough on the environment in which our food is from.

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This blog was written by Sophie Wise, a postgraduate student in Sociology (with a study abroad) at the University of Bristol.

Fresh reflection on COP 16 of the Convention on Biological Diversity

Margherita Pieraccini and Naomi Millner at COP16. Sat down and holding a block representing the SDGs,
Margherita Pieraccini and Naomi Millner at COP16.

As 2024 is drawing to a close, Conferences of the Parties (COPs) of three major Multilateral Environmental Agreements are happening in close succession: COP 16 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was held between end of October and the beginning of November, COP 29 of the UN Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is happening in mid-November, and COP 16 of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification will take place in early December.

Although exploring the synergies between these three COPs is of great importance and their close temporal proximity this year facilitates such discussion, I will focus solely on the CBD COP 16 as I had the opportunity to attend it in person as a University of Bristol academic observer.

CBD COP 16, held in Cali, Colombia started on the 21st of October and was due to end on the 1st of November. Negotiations overrun until the morning of the 2nd of November but they were suspended as the quorum was lost, leaving discussions on some key issues such as the strategy for resource mobilization to be resumed at a later date.

As biodiversity COPs are held biannually, COP 16 was the first COP since the adoption of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) at COP 15 in 2022. No one was expecting the negotiation of another major agreement at COP 16, with the key issue being the implementation of the GBF framework.

An introduction to the GBF

Differently from the Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC, the GBF is not legally binding.  Nevertheless, given that the boundary between binding and non-binding instruments in international environmental law is not always so clear-cut, the GBF has a central role in directing biodiversity law and policy. The GBF is a largely aspirational goal and target-oriented instrument. It contains four Goals to ‘live in harmony with nature’ by 2050 and 23 global Targets for 2030, split into three categories, namely ‘reducing threats to biodiversity’, ‘meeting people’s needs through sustainable use and benefit-sharing’ and ‘tools and solutions for implementation and mainstreaming’.  The Targets have different degrees of ‘quantifiability’, impacting also on Parties’ strategies and methodologies of implementation.

For example, the well- known ‘30 by 30’ target (Target 3) sets the threshold of 30% of the coverage of protected areas and other effective area-based conservation measures (OECMs) in terrestrial and inland water areas as well as marine and coastal areas to be reached by 2030. In contrast, Target 5, which still falls within the first category of ‘reducing threats to biodiversity’, is framed using a more general language: ‘ensure that the use, harvesting and trade of wild species is sustainable, safe and legal, preventing overexploitation, minimizing impacts on non-target species and ecosystems, and reducing the risk of pathogen spillover, applying the ecosystem approach, while respecting and protecting customary sustainable use by indigenous peoples and local communities.’

There are not only differences between Targets but the wordings of individual Targets themselves is sometimes contradictory, making for complex implementation as conflicting directions are suggested. For example, Target 16 pushes for the marketisation of nature, encouraging the private sector to invest in biodiversity and employing uncritically the language of green bonds and payments for ecosystem services, whilst, at the same, promoting the role of ‘Mother Earth centric action and non-market approaches’. Even if not all targets are rife with internal contradictions, other internal differences may exist, with some objectives expressed in a qualitative rather than a quantitative manner or by reference to concepts that lack unified legal definitions. This makes it more difficult to devise specific indicators, with the consequence that Parties will likely concentrate on the objectives requiring easier interpretative skills. For example, going back to the ‘30 by 30’ Target 3, the quantitative component is followed by references to ‘equitably governed systems’, which could mean very different things to different regulatory actors and there is still much work to be done on the identification of OECMs.

It should be recalled that this is not the first time the CBD employs the language of Targets and Goals. Notably, the CBD Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 included the Aichi Biodiversity Targets structured around 5 strategic goals, though most were not achieved and few partially achieved, as reported in the Global Biodiversity Outlook 5. COP 16’s focus on implementation was therefore crucial to avoid historical failures repeating themselves in 2030.

The spaces and voices of COP 16

COPs are notoriously busy and chaotic events. COP 16 of the CBD did indeed feel busy, with many side events happening simultaneously and in parallel to the formal negotiations of the two Working Groups and plenaries, as well as press conferences and Pavilion events. It was also the largest-ever CBD COP with some 23,000 registered delegates. Yet, the Conference Centre that hosted COP 16 in Cali was very capacious and the horizontal disposition of the spaces facilitated inter-ethnic, inter-generational, inter-disciplinary and of course inter-jurisdictional discussions under a Colombian sky often veiled by clouds.

It was a pleasant surprise to witness the high representation of youth, as well as indigenous peoples and local communities advocating for their rights and the rights of nature, though one may wonder if this was primarily due to the fact that COP 16 was organised in South America where the question of who is indigenous and who is not is not as contested as in other continents (such as Africa) and where youth environmental activism is thriving.

Side events also saw the participation of a plurality of voices, hosting delegates from a myriad of Inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), as well as researchers, Secretariat members and sometimes Parties. Thus, cross-fertilisation of ideas dominated the Conference with the hope that points made in side events by activists, academics, and others could filter through Parties to the negotiation tables. Indeed, many times in side events speakers addressed the audience as if it were an audience entirely made up by Parties’ delegates (seldom the case in practice), encouraging it to report back to the contact groups, which are closed working groups attended by Parties discussing draft texts of decisions.

Human rights as a framing device for different world-makings

The language of human rights pervaded the whole COP 16. This is a recent turn for the CBD, considering that the CBD itself and its instruments pre-GBF do not explicitly refer to human rights. In contrast, the GBF lists among the considerations for the implementation of the Framework a ‘human rights-based approach’. Section C 7(g) states in full that ‘the implementation of the Framework should follow a human rights-based approach, respecting, protecting, promoting and fulfilling human rights. The Framework acknowledges the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment’. There are a few other references to human rights language scattered in the text. For example, in Target 22, reference is made to the ‘full protection of environmental human rights defenders’. The GBF’s explicit inclusion of human rights language and also the acknowledgement of a substantive human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment—which cross references the UN General Assembly Resolution of 28 July 2022—has solidified the link between human rights and biodiversity protection. Thus, it is not surprising that delegates at COP 16 used human rights language extensively.

In this context, it was interesting to observe that different groups internalised and strategically deployed human rights language to advance different, sometimes, but not always complementary, world-makings. Youth representatives referred to human rights as a tool for achieving inter-generational equity in biodiversity conservation; many indigenous peoples’ representatives employed human rights language to advance substantive claims such as rights to land and resources as well as procedural ones such as participatory rights in conservation decision-making; women representatives employed human rights language to address gender inequalities in conservation; some UN representatives strongly supported a human rights-based approach to area-based conservation as a means to avoid the tragedies brought about by ‘fortress conservation’; others used human rights language to reiterate key objectives of existing international law instruments.

The concept of human rights returned over and over in COP discussions intersecting with other reflections that unwrap the many lines around which biodiversity is framed and practiced by different communities and actors.

Outcomes and beyond

As mentioned above, COP 16 was suspended leaving for a later date, decisions on some critical issues, such as finance mechanisms and monitoring mechanism to measure Parties’ progress in achieving GBF Targets and Goals. Considering the slow implementation of the GBF- only 44 Parties have submitted revised National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs), which are the main national implementation tools under Article 6 of the CBD- it is disappointing that decisions on budget and monitoring mechanisms have been left pending. However, there were also many achievements at COP 16, including:

  • the launch of the ‘Cali fund’ to operationalise the sharing of benefits from uses of digital sequence information (DSI);
  • decisions on Article 8(j), focused on traditional knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities, including the adoption of a new Programme of Work on Article 8(j) and the establishment of a new permanent subsidiary body on Article 8(j);
  • a number of sectoral decisions, including one on the mechanism for identifying ecologically or biologically significant marine areas (EBSAs), which had been the subject of legal and political discussion for eight years.

The decisions related to Article 8(j) stand out considering the central role indigenous peoples and local communities play in the protection of biodiversity and the importance of including different epistemologies in biodiversity decision-making. During COP itself, there were arguments in favour and against the creation of such subsidiary body. Concerns revolved around questions such as ‘Why fixating on only one article of the CBD? Why a subsidiary body on this specific article and not others?’, ‘Would the subsidiary body silo indigenous peoples and local communities concerns?’, ‘Should indigenous peoples and local communities still be clustered together?’ Many counter-arguments were raised promoting the establishment of the subsidiary body as a way to legitimise and render more visible indigenous peoples and local communities’ practices turning these actors as policy makers instead of policy takers included in NBSAPs. The new subsidiary body’s modus operandi will be developed over the next two years, and it will be interesting to follow such development.

Outcomes are important, and in a goal and target-oriented environmental law world such as the one the CBD governance infrastructure presents, it is natural and logical to focus on what is achieved and what is not. However, the success of COP 16, like all COPs, should not solely be determined by its outcomes. It is essential to remember the spaces and the conversations that unfolded in between, the sharing of knowledge by a global community coming together for a few days from very different paths of life and with different agendas, a multitude unified by the shared concern of biodiversity loss, which continues at unprecedented rates and deserves everyone attention in COPs and beyond.

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This blog is written by Cabot Institute for the Environment member, Professor Margherita Pieraccini, Professor of Law at the University of Bristol Law School.

Margherita Pieraccini
Margherita Pieraccini

Why UN climate summits still matter – and what to expect from Cop29

Zulfugar Graphics/Shutterstock

Every autumn, the UN holds its international climate summit or “Cop” (Conference of the Parties). Between each Cop, a smaller, lower-profile gathering takes place. Called the SB – short for “subsidary bodies” of the UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – these smaller meetings matter but don’t draw as much public attention.

The SB meetings are a world apart from Cops. Held in the same small venue in the German city of Bonn every year, the latest, SB60, had 8,606 participants whereas last year’s Cop28 in Dubai had around 100,000. Observers make up about half of the SB participants, and the atmosphere is less about being there to show you care and more focused on the matter at hand – global negotiations.

In contrast to Cops, there are no pavilions and exhibition spaces. The focus is on negotiations and side events. In June 2024, our team of climate law and policy experts from the Cabot Institute at the University of Bristol attended SB60 as observers. We prioritised going to Bonn instead of the upcoming Cop29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, because SBs offer a chance to see negotiations in flux.

In Bonn, there’s more chance to speak directly to negotiators including diplomats, heads of state, and UNFCCC staff (who are less pressed for time) – and to have an influence on policy outcomes (because positions are not yet as cemented as they are at Cops).

SB60 revealed some important sticking points and challenges for delegates going to Cop29 in Baku, which starts on November 11. The negotiations proved to be particularly difficult in three key areas.

1. A stalled transition

The first is “just transition” – the idea of making society fairer for everyone as we respond to climate change. Negotiations collapsed before the end of SB60 due to disagreements on scope, timelines and implementation planning.

The term just transition was only defined and planned for at a global governance level for the first time at last year’s Cop28. There was a real push and pull between developing and developed countries when it came to setting out the aims and scope of this plan.

Developed countries, including Norway, the US and the EU, pushed to focus on jobs and technology. Developing countries, including the UN’s coalition of 77 developing countries known as the G-77, China, small island developing states, and 54 states of the UN’s Africa Group, wanted costs to be shared fairly in a way that recognises existing inequalities between countries, and with compensation for past harms.

There was a sense that developing countries wanted to see broader system changes within the UNFCCC. One of us (Alix Dietzel) noted down how the G-77 plus China stressed that getting just transition right was “key for the future of the Cops and the regime of the UNFCCC”.

Eventually, the developed countries’ version won out at Cop28. But at SB60, it became clear there were still deep disagreements over what a just transition means and how this will play out. Negotiations over how to achieve the targets for a just transition collapsed when states could not agree whether to include wider discussions of systemic inequality and new finance goals, and whether the UNFCCC’s five-yearly global stocktake required a scaling up of ambition.

The outcome document produced on the final day of SB60 stated that parties met and negotiated – but frustratingly, did not capture any views that can be used as a basis for further negotiations.

Co-authors Alice Venn and Alix Dietzel at SB60.
Alix Dietzel, CC BY-NC-ND

2. Responding to climate loss and damage

There is increasing urgency to deliver meaningful support to developing countries experiencing the worst economic and non-economic losses from climate impacts. These range from extreme weather and sea level rise to damage to ecosystems and communities. A key priority is funding to support the recovery and preparedness of the most at-risk countries and communities.

A new loss and damage fund, currently hosted by the World Bank, was established at Cop28. So far, it has received more than US$702 million (£540 million) in pledges. At SB60, the debate focused on how best to urgently scale up this funding and make it more easily available to the communities most in need of it.

Many countries and observers called for a more inclusive approach based on human rights, and stressed the need for technical support in less developed countries.

3. Finance is key

Cop29 is all about money. Billed as “the finance Cop”, leaders in Baku must agree on a new climate finance goal. Known as the “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG), this aims to support developing countries with climate action. Industrialised nations have only met the current annual target of US$100 billion once, in 2022. SB60 was meant to lay the groundwork for a finance deal at Cop29. The outcome in Bonn, however, was disappointing.

We observed that developing countries felt frustrated at the dithering of developed nations over who should pay and how much. The Colombian government, for example, is committed to decarbonisation, but in Bonn expressed dismay at the lack of concessionary climate finance to support this process.

Developing countries seemed angry that finance flows prioritise private infrastructure investment over key sectors that are considered non-profitable, such as education, health, coastal flooding defences or landslide prevention. This makes climate adaptation harder, especially in the context of high debt burdens.

The road to Baku

The intimate setting of the SB negotiation space might look like it could deliver better climate outcomes compared to huge Cops. Negotiators at Cop28 were crowded out by lobbyists and industry representatives. In Bonn this year, smaller numbers meant delegates could more easily meet for informal huddles outside the negotiation rooms.

conference room with chairs, signs for country names and big screen with blue presentation for climate finance discussions
Finance negotiations will be centre stage at Cop29.
Alix Dietzel, CC BY-NC-ND

At the Cop climate summits, observers like us normally don’t have a significant voice. But at SB60, interactive workshops and contact groups gave observers opportunities to speak. We held a side event with the global mayors network, C40 Cities, and Earthshot prize winners, the environmental and youth empowerment group Green Africa Youth Organization. Discussions focused on how to make urban climate policy more inclusive, and we later introduced ourselves to the UK negotiation team.

Contributions from civil society observers were recorded by the UNFCCC and incorporated into official SB reports on finance and loss and damage. Nevertheless, big decisions on just transition, loss and damage, and climate finance are constrained by competing geopolitical and economic interests, regardless of the size of the negotiating space.

SB60 set the scene for two weeks of fractious negotiations in Baku. Climate change-induced extreme weather events and changing weather patterns are accelerating. Key climate tipping points could be breached soon.

Developing countries will require trillions of dollars a year to adapt to and mitigate these extreme scenarios. Based on what we experienced in Bonn, a finance deal at Baku that delivers climate action for developing countries seems a long way off.

The Conversation

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This blog is written by Cabot Institute for the Environment members, Drs Alix Dietzel, Senior Lecturer in Climate Justice, University of Bristol; Alice Venn, Senior Lecturer in Climate Law, University of Bristol, and Katharina Richter, Lecturer in Climate Change, Politics and Society, University of BristolThis article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Dr Alix Dietzel
Dr Alix Dietzel
Dr Alice Venn
Katharina Richter
Dr Katharina Richter

What Works – Co-devising a place-based green skills plan in Bristol

Young man fixing solar panels to a roof

The UK Green Jobs Taskforce has called for new policies to build pathways into “good, green careers” for young people and a just transition for workers in carbon-heavy jobs. Skills development is central to this: providing school leavers with new opportunities and supporting older workers to find an off-ramp from jobs that may be phased out in the future.

Green skills gaps’ hinder climate action: more workers are needed to retrofit buildings and build green infrastructure . UK Chancellor Rachel Reeves, in the 2024 autumn budget, pledged £3.4bn for the warm homes plan to upgrade buildings and lower energy bills alongside building new homes, the creation of Great British Energy and investing in EVs. Workers are needed to do so.

Beyond specific new roles and skillsets, one in five jobs in the UK will experience some change to the skills required. Such ‘green’ skills can be understood as ‘future’ or ‘resilient’ skills: training that allows people to have long-term job security rooted in policies to achieve net zero by 2050.

As the Local Government Association has argued, while the role of local authorities remains unclear, devolved decision-making for green skills allows provision to be place-based and locally driven, responding to the needs and opportunities in different communities.

In our recent work, supported by the Cabot Institute for the Environment and Policy Bristol through What Works funding from Research England, we have worked to foreground these national discussions of green skills in the context of Bristol and the neighbourhood of Lawrence Weston.

Why green skills matter in (Bristol and) Lawrence Weston In 2022, Bristol City Council launched the 20 year Bristol City Leap programme, partnering with Ameresco to accelerate city decarbonisation. One of the initiative’s ambitions is to create at least 1000 local jobs. This creates an opportunity: to both create new green jobs and to ensure they are shared equitably across Bristol – benefiting those who need them most.

We focus here on Lawrence Weston, a post-war housing estate and home to 7,000 people on the north-west outskirts of Bristol, where deprivation levels are some of the highest in Bristol and the UK. The area is home to Ambition Lawrence Weston (ALW) a resident-led group formed in 2012 working to make the neighbourhood a better place to live, and achieving national fame with their building of a community-owned onshore wind turbine in 2022.

Lawrence Weston has primary and secondary schools but further education colleges offering skills, trade or vocational training require residents to travel across the city or beyond. ALW have recently moved into a new community hub ‘Ambition House’ and hope to, among many other services, host new green skills opportunities for the local community, providing many in the area with a local opportunity for new skills and qualifications and helping address current barriers to post-secondary education in the community.

Co-devising green skills approaches

Community spaces and organisations can be a key space for green skills development. They can provide launchpad sites for skills offerings, taster sessions, or short courses. Whilst employers may re-skill workers in the workplace, localised skills offering can reach those who may otherwise struggle to engage: increasing accessibility by bringing new opportunities directly to the community.

Over the past year, we have worked with Ambition Lawrence Weston and other partners to understand green skills needs in Bristol, and the barriers to gaining those skills and accessing new jobs – particularly in the context of Lawrence Weston. To do so, we teamed up with the Civic University Agreement team to bring together key stakeholders in local and regional government, further and higher education, and ‘green’ sectors to understand what should happen in this space – and how to make it happen.

We held two workshops – in June and October 2024 – to co-develop new green skills approaches in Bristol and, with it, to position Lawrence Weston as a key space in which to pilot and develop such initiatives.

What we found and why it matters

Place-based approaches are important as they allow us to meet people where they are and understand how different circumstances define potential take-up and engagement. Jobs and skills policy will need to engage various groups in different ways, these include school-leavers, those not in education, employment or training (who would benefit from new, resilient career pathways), and people already working, who may need to update professional skills.

These people are characterised by diverse experiences and needs but many shared barriers can be found. These include:

  • Physical accessibility, linked to travel distances and costs and lack of affordable public transport.
  • Lack of confidence to engage due to language and other barriers
  • Financial factors, with a cost-of-living crisis creating pressing, significant financial pressures that create an ‘earn or learn’ equation.
  • Lack of awareness of local opportunities – and how this varies in different neighbourhoods.
  • Overlapping with the above, the time required to train – linked to travel distances, the timing of sessions, caring responsibilities, and the need to continue earning.

To overcome these barriers, a place-based green skills approach must:

  1. Understand how these factors interact with more subjective barriers – such as a lack of aspiration or confidence in working in emergent sectors and careers or in learning new skills. Key here is engaging with young people early – even as early as primary school – to signal what these new jobs are and how they are available to all.
  2. Be guided by employers of all sizes to identify the skills pathways required: people need to be able to enrol in a course safe in the knowledge that these skills learned will be needed and valued for many years into the future.
  3. Provide financial support: a key solution is in funded training schemes where workers are ‘paid to learn’: be it through reimbursement for lost work, paying travel costs, and/or providing meals. In Wales, the Personal Learning Accounts scheme provides financial support to study new skills and qualifications, including skills in net zero and green technologies.
  4. Include ‘softer’ skills to support business development and growth. This is to support those working for or managing smaller businesses to link into established supply chains, bid for certain ‘green’ work, and build confidence in these new industries and trades. Ideas here include providing mentors and career champions, hosting job fairs and information sessions, and working with Skills Connect careers guidance materials.

Labour’s budget may give clarity on what skills will be required yet certainty is needed locally: through both financial support and clearer direction on how these skills can be accessed.

Green skills gaps require locally-led solutions. In our work, we are getting closer. Our next steps included working with schools and careers advisors to create materials that move beyond boosting awareness and towards showing young people routes into new green jobs and continuing to work to get green skills into Lawrence Weston soon.

Doing so ensures that the future of ‘green’ education can empower people as much as it can decarbonise the city around them.

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This blog is written by Cabot Institute for the Environment members Drs Ed Atkins (Geographical Sciences) and Caroline Bird (Computer Science).

Ed Atkins
Ed Atkins
Caroline Bird

Why climate activists keep targeting art galleries – despite public outcry

Two Just Stop Oil activists were recently jailed for 27 months and 20 months respectively for throwing soup at one of Vincent van Gogh’s Sunflowers paintings at London’s National Gallery back in October 2022. Some commentators suggested these were overly harsh sentences for a nonviolent protest, while others felt such sentences were appropriate and an important deterrent.

We study activism and its impact (and sometimes have participated in direct actions like these). In our latest research, we looked at 42 climate protests at museums and art galleries in Europe, the US, Canada and Australia between 2022 and 2024. We wanted to know what makes this form of protest so unpopular with the general public, and why climate activists have continued to return to galleries despite, or even because of, the resulting social outrage.

As it happens, we published our work in the journal Protest just a few days before the Just Stop Oil activists were sentenced.

One common theme we found is that such protests are widely criticised because of their supposed irrationality. For instance, in his sentencing remarks in the Sunflowers case, Judge Christopher Hehir spoke for many when he described the soup-throwing action as “criminally idiotic”.

However, we should consider the logic offered by the activists themselves. The video of the action in October 2022 shows one of them, Phoebe Plummer, asking: “What is worth more – art or life? Is [art] worth more than food, more than justice?”

Soup on Sunflowers (2022)

The judge claimed these words revealed “how little the [protesters] cared about Van Gogh’s Sunflowers, or art generally”. This seems an odd misunderstanding. The question of which is worth more – art or life – only warrants interest because the value of life is being compared to objects that are considered to be the most valuable products of human culture. We wouldn’t be having this conversation if Just Stop Oil had thrown soup over a less-heralded artwork.

Why is (apparent) art destruction so powerful?

Throwing soup at paintings is extremely unpopular. We recently commissioned a YouGov poll in which 2,048 representative members of the public were asked about 15 different forms of climate protest. Throwing food at paintings was considered the least justifiable of these protests – less justifiable than sabotaging pipelines, damaging private jets or breaking windows at companies financing oil exploration.

The extreme unpopularity of throwing soup at Sunflowers virtually guaranteed that it would have an audience of millions. Although commentators worried that such an unpopular action would turn people away from the cause, there is no evidence for such an impact. The public may hate the messengers and their actions, but they’re nevertheless exposed to the message.

Indeed, we suspect the reason activists target art is directly related to why it is so unpopular. In academic psychology, terror management theory suggests that damaging revered cultural symbols threatens the psychological defences we rely on to mitigate existential fears.

Think of how memorials are built to soldiers who die in war, to offer them a form of symbolic immortality (“they shall not grow old”), and the way any threat to desecrate such memorials is met with strong condemnation.

Masterpieces like Sunflowers offer a similar sense of immortality and permanence. In a way, our veneration of his work means that Van Gogh is still alive, and its preservation means our culture will live on after our own demise. This explains why the apparent destruction of art provokes such a strong backlash, and why activists use the spectacle to draw parallels between cultural and environmental preservation.

It seems the symbolic value of the painting was an important factor in Judge Hehir’s sentencing. In his words:

It is not the value of the damage caused to the frame that is the most serious aspect of your offending … [Van Gogh’s] work is part of humanity’s shared cultural treasure … you came within the thickness of a pane of glass of irreparably damaging or even destroying this priceless treasure, and that must be reflected in the sentences I pass.

Punishment should fit the crime

Another YouGov poll conducted in July 2023 found fewer than 30% of the UK public think prison sentences are appropriate for nonviolent protesters; only 6% favour sentences of “more than a year in prison”. Over twice as many (15%) don’t believe there should be any punishment for nonviolent protest.

The appropriate punishment for radical dissent should be a matter of concern for all of us. Punishment is not only about retribution. It also communicates societal disapproval. Judge Hehir said: “Sentences must be imposed which both adequately punish you for what you did, and what you risked, and which will deter others whose motivations may incline them to similar behaviour.”

In the immediate aftermath of the sentencing of Plummer and her co-defendant Anna Holland, another three Just Stop Oil activists visited the same gallery in London. They have been charged with criminal damage after soup was thrown at the protective glass of two other paintings by Van Gogh.

Solidarity protests happened in Norway, Sweden, Canada and Germany. Rather than deterring activists, in the immediate term the sentencing seemed to backfire by causing more protests.

These protests trigger a powerful desire for punishment and condemnation. But society would benefit from a sincere attempt to understand the rationale and motivations of those activists who seem to go beyond the normal bounds of protest. Deterrence will not work for those who are acting by their own moral imperatives. It will not stop those climate activists who are drawn to radical symbolic action in order to interrupt the “business as usual” that is leading toward the destruction of both art and life.


This blog is written by Alexander Araya López, Postdoctoral research fellow, University of Potsdam and Cabot Institute for the Environment member Colin Davis, Chair in Cognitive Psychology, University of Bristol. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Earth’s greatest mass extinction 250 million years ago shows what happens when El Niño gets out of control – new study

252 million years ago, there was only one supercontinent: Pangaea.
ManuMata / shutterstock

Around 252 million years ago, the world suddenly heated up. Over a geologically brief period of tens of thousands of years, 90% of species were wiped out. Even insects, which are rarely touched by such events, suffered catastrophic losses. The Permian-Triassic mass extinction, as it’s known, was the greatest of the “big five” mass extinctions in Earth’s history.

Scientists have generally blamed the mass extinction on greenhouse gases released from a vast network of volcanoes which covered much of modern day Siberia in lava. But the volcanic explanation was incomplete. In our new study, we show that an enormous El Niño weather pattern in the world’s major ocean added to climate chaos and led to extinctions spreading across the globe.

It’s easy to see why volcanoes were blamed. The onset of extinction coincides almost perfectly with the beginning of the second phase of volcanism in the region known as the Siberian Traps. This led to acid rain, oceans losing their oxygen and, most notably, temperatures beyond the tolerance levels of almost all organisms. It was the greatest episode of global warming in the past 500 million years.

The world 252 million years ago

Map of world with one big supercontinent
Alex Farnsworth

However, there were outstanding questions for proponents of this seemingly simple extinction scenario: when the tropics became too hot, why did species not just migrate to cooler, higher latitudes (as is happening today)? If warming was sudden and rapid, why did species on land die off tens of thousands of years before those in the sea?

There have also been many instances of volcanic eruptions of similar scale, and even other episodes of rapid warming, but why did none of these cause a similarly catastrophic mass extinction?

Our new study reveals that the oceans rapidly heated up all across the world’s low and mid latitudes. Normally, it gets cooler as you move away from the tropics, but not this time. It simply became too hot for life in too many places.

A world prone to extremes

Using a state-of-the-art computer program, we were able to simulate what the weather and climate was like 252 million years ago. We found that, even before the rapid warming, the world would have been prone to extremes of temperature and rainfall.

That’s a consequence of all the land at the time forming into one large supercontinent, Pangaea. This meant that the climates we see today at the centre of continents – dry, with hot summers and freezing winters – were magnified.

Pangaea was surrounded by a vast ocean, Panthalassa, the surface of which would fluctuate between warm and cool periods over the years, much like the El Niño phenomenon in the Pacific today. Yet once the mass Siberian volcanism started and carbon dioxide in the atmosphere increased, those prehistoric El Niños became more intense and lasted longer thanks to the larger Panthalassa ocean being able to store more heat.

An El Niño far stronger than anything today

chart of el nino fluctuations
Change in sea surface temperature (SST) compared to the long-term average. El Niño conditions are red, La Niña (or its prehistoric equivalent) is blue. Left = modern day pre-industrial Pacific Ocean. Centre = 252 million years ago, before the Siberian Traps volcanism. Right = at the peak of the mass extinction.
Alex Farnsworth

These El Niños had a profound impact on life on land, and kicked off a sequence of events that made the climate more and more extreme. Temperatures got hotter, especially in the tropics, and huge droughts and fires caused tropical forests to die off.

This in turn was bad news for the climate, as less carbon was stored by trees, allowing more to linger in the atmosphere, leading to further warming, and even stronger and longer El Niños.

252 million years ago, pre crisis:

Animated map of temperature 252m years ago
Before the Siberian Traps volcanism 252 million years ago, the world was slightly hotter than today. (Animation shows average monthly temperatures according to the authors’ climate model).
Alex Farnsworth

These stronger El Niños caused the extreme temperatures and droughts to push outside of the tropics towards the poles, and more vegetation died off and more carbon was released. Over tens of thousands of years, extreme temperatures spread over much of the world’s surface. Eventually, the warming began to harm life in the oceans, particularly tiny organisms at the bottom of the food chain.

…and at the peak of the extinction:

Animated map of temperature 252m years ago
At the peak of the extinction, temperatures regularly soared far above 40°C.
Alex Farnsworth

During the peak of the crisis, in a world that was already warming thanks to volcanic gases, an El Niño would boost average temperatures by a further 4°C. That’s more than three times the total warming we have caused over the past few centuries. Back then, the El Niño-charged climate would have regularly seen peak daytime temperatures on land of 60°C or more.

The future of El Niño

In recent years El Niños have caused major changes to rainfall and temperature patterns, around the Pacific and even further afield. A strong El Niño was a factor in record-breaking temperatures through 2023 and 2024.

Fortunately, such events typically only last a few years. However, on top of human-caused warming, even these smaller scale El Niños of the present day may be enough to push fragile ecosystems beyond their limit.

El Niño is predicted to become more variable as the climate changes, though we should note that the oceans are still yet to fully respond to current warming rates. At present, nobody is forecasting another mass extinction on the scale of the one 252 million years ago, but that event provides a worrying snapshot of what happens when El Niño gets out of control.The Conversation

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This blog is written by Dr Alex Farnsworth, Senior Research Associate in Meteorology, University of Bristol; David Bond, Palaeoenvironmental Scientist, University of Hull, and Paul Wignall, Professor of Palaeoenvironments, University of LeedsThis article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Building resilience of the UK food system to weather and climate shocks

Climate-driven changes in extreme weather events are one of the highest-risk future shocks to the UK food system, underlining the importance of preparedness across the food chain. However, the CCC’s 2023 report on adaptation progress highlighted that current climate adaptation plans and policies, and their delivery and implementation for UK food security are either insufficient or limited. Through an ongoing Met Office cross-academic partnership activity (‘SuperRAP’) working across all eight partner universities (including Bristol), Defra, the Food Standards Agency, UKRI-BBSRC and the Global Food Security Programme, a recent perspective paper, and associated online workshops and surveys in January 2023 have:  

  • Scoped out the direct impacts of weather and climate extremes on the UK food supply chain, 
  • Highlighted areas where weather and climate information could support resilience across time and space scales through decision making and action, 
  • Identified key knowledge gaps, 
  • Made recommendations for future research and funding, and 
  • Scoped out the potential adaptation/policy responses to the direct impacts of weather and climate extremes on the food chain, and the resulting trade-offs and consequences  
The potential for weather and climate information to support decision making in agricultural and food system-related activities, and improved resilience to weather and climate shocks across time and space scales. Grey background boxes represent generalised meteorological capabilities; light blue ellipses with white outlines denote potential applications. © Crown Copyright 2021, Met Office. From Falloon et al. 2022.

However, a major gap remains in understanding the changes needed to rapidly increase the delivery and implementation of climate adaptation in support of resilience in the UK food system. A workshop on this topic was held at the University of Reading’s Henley Business School on 13-14 June 2024 bringing together academics across a wide range of disciplines and presented findings back to industry and government stakeholders for their feedback and prioritisation.  

The workshop aimed to consider key areas for supporting resilience and adaptation to climate change identified by the January 2023 workshop including innovation and trialling novel management and production approaches, social innovation and enabling behavioural shifts, mutual learning, and underpinning evidence gaps. The workshop was supported by a cross-sector survey on adaptation barriers and priorities. 

Overarching themes identified in the workshop included the need for a strategic, system-wide, and long-term approach, underpinned by strong inter- and transdisciplinary collaboration. 

Critical evidence gaps include improving understanding of: 

  • Impacts of international dimensions and trade on UK food ingredient and packaging availability, compared to UK-sourced products – and their interactions
  • Impacts of climate extremes on production and transport and effective adaptation options
  • Impacts of climate shocks on UK livelihood systems, households and consumers
  • Broader adaptation and transformation needed to escape existing ‘doom loops’
  • Application of tech solutions (e.g. GM/gene editing) for climate resilience and adaptation

Other issues raised included thresholds for change, land pressures, substitutability of different foods, impacts of government policy, nutrition, regenerative practices, and interactions with the energy sector. 

Recommended ways forward include: 

  • Tools, models, and methods that consider risks across the food chain and system outcomes
  • A focus on inter- and trans-disciplinary approaches.
  • Increased international collaboration/cooperation, and stronger government-science interactions
  • Enhancing food chain data access, use and integration, and a supportive enabling environment
  • Long-term trials: to provide evidence of impacts of alternative practices
  • Preparing the transport network for climate extremes.
  • A refresh of the National Food Strategy, building on latest science
  • A new funding landscape: long-term, strategic, visionary, systemic, trans- and interdisciplinary, co-designed and coordinated.

Other issues raised included: sharing responsibility and joined-up, transparent approaches across sectors and institutions; risk mitigation tools; use cases and roadmaps; welfare responses; interdisciplinary skills training; and research across a wider range of crops. 

We are aiming to produce a peer-reviewed perspective paper on critical research (and practice) gaps, and recommendations for the way forward.  

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This blog was written by Professor Pete Falloon from the Cabot Institute for the Environment and Met Office.

A bald headed man smiling with dark rimmed glasses.
Professor Pete Falloon

Chemical industry failing to stop emissions of super-strong greenhouse gas HFC-23 – new research

The potent greenhouse gas HFC-23 is emitted from the industrial production of fluoroplastics and specific refrigerants.
Quality Stock Arts/Shutterstock

Emissions of a super-strong greenhouse gas could be substantially reduced if factories would properly implement existing “destruction technology” in certain industrial production processes. If operated properly, emissions of this greenhouse gas could be cut by at least 85% – that’s equivalent to 17% of carbon dioxide emissions from global aviation.

Our research, published today in the journal Nature, scrutinises emissions of one of the most potent hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) greenhouse gases, called trifluoromethane (HFC-23). One gram of HFC-23 in the atmosphere contributes as much to the greenhouse effect as 12kg of carbon dioxide.

This unwanted byproduct comes from the production of certain gases used as refrigerants and the manufacture of fluoropolymers (a class of plastic chemicals) such as polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE), a key ingredient in most non-stick cookware.

black frying pan, single friend egg, dark background.
Fluoroplastics are used in the production of non-stick cookware.
J.Thasit/Shutterstock

More than 150 countries have pledged to significantly reduce their HFC-23 emissions as part of the 2016 Kigali Amendment to an international treaty called the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer. The breakdown of HFCs in the atmosphere does not directly link to ozone depletion, but HFCs were introduced to replace ozone-depleting substances such as chloroflourocarbons (CFCs), so they have been included in this regulation.

HFCs are also strong greenhouse gases. While the Kigali Amendment aims to reduce emissions of widely used HFCs, an exceptional arrangement is made for HFC-23. Because HFC-23 is largely emitted from production processes and not from end-use applications, its destruction as a by-product is required “to the extent practicable” as of 2020 – that means as much as possible, but it’s a vague limit.

Even before 2020, many countries, including the biggest manufacturers of PTFE such as China, reported they had installed destruction technologies at PTFE factories and are successfully destroying HFC-23. In 2020, the reported global annual emissions of HFC-23 were only around 2,000 metric tonnes – but actual global emissions, derived from atmospheric measurements, amounted to around 16,000 metric tonnes.

To unravel this discrepancy between real and reported emissions, we analysed HFC-23 emissions from a major European PTFE factory in the Netherlands, which already operates destruction technologies – these include the incineration of harmful byproducts.

The aim of our experiment was to define what “practicable” actually means, and to identify how much HFC-23 can be easily destroyed by existing technology at a factory-wide scale, considering that emissions come from both the chimneys and leaks from other parts of the plant.

With the factory’s collaboration and the consent of the Dutch environment authorities, we released a controlled amount of a tracer gas directly next to the factory: this is a non-toxic, degradable gas that does not occur in the atmosphere. We then measured the concentrations of HFC-23, other byproducts of flouropolymer manufacture, and the released tracer at an observing site run by the Europe-wide greenhouse gas research centre, the Integrated Carbon Observation System, near the Dutch village of Cabauw.

This 213m-tall tower is located around 25km away from the factory. We knew exactly how much tracer we had released and how much of it arrived at the measuring point, so we could calculate the emissions of HFC-23 and other gases.

aerial shot of tall metal tower, green fields
Measurements of HFC-23 and the tracer were carried out at the 213m Cabauw measuring mast, operated by the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute.
ICOS RI/Tom Oudijk, Sander Karsen, Dennis Manda, CC BY-NC-ND

Results showed that even though our estimated emissions were higher than those reported by the factory, the technology at this particular factory was working properly and successfully destroying HFC-23.

Upscaling to global emissions

However, as the industrial manufacture of fluoropolymers is currently the major known source of HFC-23 to the atmosphere, we suspect that destruction technologies are not as effectively operated as reported by manufacturers.

Our findings indicate that if all factories globally were controlling emissions in the same way as the Dutch site, HFC-23 emissions could be cut by at least around 85%, representing emissions equivalent to 170 million metric tonnes of carbon dioxide per year. This reduction equates to almost one-fifth (17%) of carbon dioxide emissions generated by all aviation traffic.

Real and reported emissions of HFC-23

An independent auditing framework for fluoropolymer production would ensure that HFC-23 is destroyed properly at factories around the world. Targeted monitoring of greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the production of fluorochemicals would further the understanding of emission sources and ensure that countries are fully compliant under different international climate and environment agreements.

Our results show that destruction technologies can effectively be implemented – in this case, at factories producing fluoropolymers such as PTFE, to significantly reduce the emissions of a highly potent greenhouse gas.


This blog is written by Dr Dominique Rust, Research Associate, School of Chemistry, University of Bristol; Dr Kieran Stanley, Senior Research Fellow, School of Chemistry, University of Bristol, and Stephen Henne, Senior Scientist, Group Atmospheric Modelling and Remote Sensing, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich.  This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Dr Kieran Stanley
Dr Dominique Rust

How fly fishing strengthens our connection with wildlife and fosters conservation efforts

Whether it’s to reset our mental health or simply to take time out from the hurly-burly of work and urban life, many of us head for oceans and rivers to enjoy their restorative capacities.

Encountering wild animals in these blue spaces contributes to the beneficial effects of being in nature and forms the basis of tourist economies the world over.

Yet, how does our presence affect the creatures that call blue spaces home, and how do encounters with wild species change our relationships with natural environments?

River and stones with green trees and shade
The River Lyd, Devon. Avi Shankar

For nearly a decade, we have been researching human interactions with wild trout and salmon in the context of fly fishing. We spent months immersed in river environments both in the UK (the Lyd and Tamar in Devon, and the Usk and Wye in Wales) and North America (the rivers of the Gaspe region, Quebec and Lewisburg, Pennsylvania). We went fishing, observed and interviewed fly fishers, and learned as much as we could about fish behaviour.

In our recent paper, we explain how human interactions with fish can result in three kinds of interspecies encounters that strengthen people’s connections with wildlife and natural environments.

Separated encounters

Most often, wild animals remain indifferent to humans, driven as they are by natural motivations to feed and breed, within environmental habitats that humans do not fully understand.

For instance, Duane, a novice fly fisher we interviewed in Pennsylvania, didn’t know that trout eat aquatic insects: “I didn’t know squat … flies actually come out of the water?”

This lack of understanding of other species often ensures that wild animals remain undisturbed by human presence. Yet the elusiveness of creatures such as trout and salmon can also motivate people to find out more about them.

Slippery encounters

To improve their chances of catching fish, fly fishers learn about fish behaviour, river environments and the life cycles of the insects that fish feed on.

Equipped with this knowledge, fly fishers become better able to locate trout and salmon, and to select and cast a near weightless imitation “fly” designed to mimic a fish’s insect food.

Learning and honing these skills is a lifelong project during which fly fishers become savvy hunters with heightened abilities to sense what is going on in the water. Equally, fish learn too, becoming shy and ready to slip away from human contact.

Sticky encounters

On the rare occasions that fish are hooked, humans and fish enter what we call a “sticky encounter”. The mixed emotions of catching a wild salmon are captured in Annetta’s field notes:

I look down at this beautiful, majestic being. The fish is a fresh, healthy, silver, bright female … I look at her, she looks back at me … She wrangles free. She’s on a mission to spawn in her home river. I stand up but I’m weak in the knees. Full of pride, humility, and guilt.

Over time, these intense experiences of eye-to-eye contact can inspire fly fishers to consider the welfare of fish.

A wild Usk brown trout in a net
Netted: a wild Usk brown trout – most fly fishers now carefully return their catch back into the river. Avi Shankar

Fly fishers now release the majority of the fish they catch. Moreover, one fly fisher we interviewed explained that he has entirely removed the hooks from his flies, declaring: “I don’t want to catch that fish. I caught so many in my life. I know what the feeling is like.”

Stewarding blue spaces

It may seem ironic that fly fishers become passionate about conserving fish and river environments by practising what many people consider to be a cruel sport. Yet, fly fishers have first-hand experience of declining fish numbers.

Some of our interviewees spoke of trout and salmon as “canaries in the coal mine” – a warning sign of how river ecosystems are threatened by pollution, overdevelopment and climate change. In response, organisations such as the Wild Trout Trust and the Atlantic Salmon Trust highlight the necessity for conservation.

With wild populations of animals declining globally, the presence of humans in blue spaces deserves scrutiny. Nevertheless, interspecies encounters can change the relationship between people, fish and rivers from one of human gratification to one of reciprocity, stewardship and care.

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This blog is written by Professor Avi Shankar, Professor of Consumer Research at the University of Bristol. It is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Avi Shankar standin in the street
Professor Avi Shankar