Crisis in Ukraine: The energy implications

Energy security- a primarily theoretical concept in recent years that has been made startlingly real by the recent developments in Ukraine. But what could the possible repercussions of this crisis be on European energy policies and our fuel bills?

I had a chance to ask this question during a recent event at the House of Commons, hosted by the APPCCG and Sandbag. The answer surprised me.

According to Baroness Worthington, director of Sandbag and member of the House of Lords, two outcomes are broadly possible.

Figure 1: Map of Ukraine
The first scenario is of a stabilisation of the diplomatic situation and the emergence of a westward-leaning Ukraine. In this situation, it is likely that Ukraine might choose to exploit its own natural gas reserves, estimated to be in the region of 1.1 trillion cubic metres. Ukraine possesses the 26th largest natural gas reserve in the world, which is estimated to be more than half the size of the combined reserves of the EU.

If Ukraine `turns on the taps’, this would solve their immediate energy dependence on Russia and produce a revenue stream to support their economy. However, exploiting natural resources on the scale required would require significant investment, and Ukrainians would have to accept the change in land use and economic transformations that come with becoming a major energy exporter.

This optimistic outcome seems open to several criticisms. It’s unclear at this moment where investment would come from, and whether Russia would oppose competition in the European energy market. Moreover, can Ukraine ever completely replace Russia as an energy supplier? For instance, Russia’s natural gas reserves are around 40 times the size of Ukraine’s.

The second scenario is of a destabilised Ukraine, whose policies are influenced to a significant degree by Moscow. In this situation, European nations would need to purchase natural gas in the short-to-medium term from Russia and Ukraine, and tamely accept price rises and the uncertainty and energy insecurity that comes with dependence on a foreign nation for energy supplies.

This second possibility may also be criticised; Russia may not have further demands after the annexation of Crimea is completed. It may be the case that Russia wish to return to business as usual as quickly as possible, and may choose to offer energy supplies on favourable terms to Europe in order to encourage the resumption of trade and renewed trust.

In my view, both scenarios will result in one predominant outcome: the loss of trust. It seems unlikely that Russia can regain the trust of the West quickly; by it’s very nature, trust takes years to accrue and moments to lose. Energy security will become a much larger talking point in the next few years if relations with Russia continue to remain cool. Nations that previously were willing to base their energy supply on foreign gas purchases will choose instead to pay a price or environmental premium to source those supplies from more trusted sources.

The nations most likely to make changes to their energy mix as a result of this crisis are Germany and Poland. Germany’s choice to abandon nuclear fission after the Fukushima crisis leaves them slightly more vulnerable to a loss of fuel supplies from abroad, and they may choose to shift further towards renewables, or attempt the politically difficult U-turn of returning to nuclear power. Poland uses natural gas and coal to power much of its economy, a significant portion of which is purchased from Russia. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Poland has been consistently suspicious of Russia, and may decide that now is the time to reduce or remove their dependence on Russian supplies.

Figure 2: DECC figure for natural gas supplies by source, 2010-2013
As for the fuel bills of UK consumers, it’s unlikely that we will see any immediate effects. If sanctions on Russia are imposed, this may raise gas prices worldwide, but the UK does not directly obtain its supplies from Russia. The most likely change to the UK’s energy mix will be one that was on the cards already- an expansion in the exploitation of shale gas. Using energy security as a primary argument, supporters of shale gas may now find it easier to convince others that fracking and onshore gas exploitation should continue or be accelerated.

Perhaps the Ukraine crisis will be the public relations coup the shale gas industry has been looking for.

This blog is written by Neeraj Oak, Cabot Institute.
Neeraj Oak

The carbon mountain: Dealing with the EU allowance surplus

It’s not news that the EU emissions trading system (EU-ETS) is in trouble. A build-up of surplus emission allowances has caused dangerous instability in the carbon market and a plunge in prices since the economic slump in 2008 began (See Figure 1, courtesy of David Hone).

Figure 1, courtesy of David Hone

The discussion at the All Party Parliamentary Climate Change Group’s (APPCCG) meeting on the 28th of January centred on the causes and consequences of the EU-ETS allowance surplus. The majority of speakers at this session had a background in the discipline of economics, so inevitably the exchange of views was… frank.  The panel were in agreement that EU-ETS is in crisis; but can and should it be saved?

Emissions trading schemes, of which EU-ETS is a canonical example, are an attempt to allow market forces to correct the so-called ‘market failure’ that is carbon emission. From the point of view of a classical economist, the participants in carbon emitting industries do not naturally feel the negative effects their activities cause to the environment. Emissions trading forces carbon emitters to ‘purchase’ the right to pollute on a market. In effect, they pay to receive permits (or allowances) to emit a certain level of emissions. If they do not reach this level of emission, the excess can be sold back onto the market, allowing others to make use of it. The prices of permits are determined by market forces, so cannot be fixed by the EU. The quantity of permits is within the control of the EU, and this is where the problem lies.

In the aftermath of the 2008 slump, a surplus of allowances began to build up, leading to a crash in the price of allowances. Many commentators blame EU economic forecasting for this problem, as the recession and consequent reduction in economic activity was not factored in to the EU-ETS control mechanism. Criticism has been forthcoming for the economic models used, and some go as far as to liken the mismanagement of EU-ETS to the ‘wine-lake and butter-mountain’ days of the 1980s, where the Common Agricultural policy was allowed to consume over 70% of the EU’s budget. Perhaps the models are too simple – James Cameron, a speaker at the APPCCG event, spoke of the ‘premium on simplicity’ that exists in creating policy. Maybe that approach has extended itself into the mathematical models used to predict the performance of EU-ETS, rendering them over-simplistic?

Personally, I see things a little differently. It’s clear that economic models are often far from perfect; however, I’m not sure that’s where the problem lies. In the implementation of policy, decision makers have to draw on the implications of many separate models; for instance, they must consider the GDP growth of EU member states, their adoption rate of new energy efficiency standards and the relative industrialisation of their economies. To my mind, the greatest source of error is in the gaps and interfaces between these economic models. Policy makers must make decisions on how to interpret the way economic predictions will interact with one another, and these interpretations are always subject to value judgements. What we need is a more joined-up approach.

Climate science has long used ‘macro-models’ to incorporate a variety of physical processes into their predictions, an approach that could be adopted by economists as well. While the first economic macro-models may not achieve even a fraction of the accuracy of climate models, that is not to say they cannot be improved through collaboration and quantitative criticism. Perhaps now is the time to make a start?

This blog is written by Neeraj Oak, Cabot Institute.

 

 

Neeraj Oak

Nine lessons and carols in communicating climate uncertainty

About a month ago I was invited to represent the Cabot Institute at the All Parliamentary Party Climate Change Group (APPCCG) meeting on “Communicating Risk and Uncertainty around Climate Change”. All Party Groups are groups of MPs and Lords with a common interest they wish to discuss, who meet regularly but fairly informally. Here are the APPCCG registerblogTwitter and list of events.

The speakers were James Painter (University of Oxford), Chris Rapley (UCL) and Fiona Harvey (The Guardian), and the chair was (Lord) Julian Hunt (UCL). Rather than write up my meeting notes, I’ll focus on the key points.

[Disclaimer: All quotes and attributions are based on my recollections and note-taking, and may not be exact.]

1. People have a finite pool of worry
I’ll start with this useful phrase, mentioned (I think by Chris) in the discussion. Elke Weber describes this:
“As worry increases about one type of risk, concern about other risks has been shown to go down, as if people had only so much capacity for worry or a finite pool of worry. Increased concern about global warming may result in decreased concern about other risks…the recent financial crisis reduced concern about climate change and environmental degradation.” — “What shapes perceptions of climate change?”; pdf currently here)

Lessons: We cannot expect or ask people to worry about everything: concern about other issues can reduce concern about climate change, while evoking strong emotions about climate change can reduce concern about other issues. So Chris encouraged talking about opportunities, rather than threats, wherever possible.

2. People interpret uncertainty as ignorance
People often interpret the word “uncertainty” as complete ignorance, rather than, for example, partial ignorance(..!) or a well-defined range of possible outcomes. This may be due to language: “I’m not certain” is close to “I don’t know”.

Just as important is exposure to research science. Science is often presented as a book of facts, when in fact it is a messy process of reducing our uncertainty about the world. At a school this year the head teacher told us about an Ofsted inspection during which they had a fantastic science workshop, where groups of students solved challenging problems using real data. At the end of the day, the inspector said: “Fine, but wouldn’t it have been quicker to have told them the answer first?”

Lessons: Revolutionise the education system.

3. People are uncomfortable with uncertainty
Even when people do understand uncertainty, it can become a convenient rug under which to brush difficult decisions. Chris said that over-emphasising uncertainty leads to decision-making paralysis. When a decision invokes fear or anxiety (or, I would add, political disagreement), uncertainty can be used to dismiss the decision entirely.

“The Higgs boson”, Chris said, “was not a ball bearing found down the back of sofa, but a statistical result”. It was just possible it hadn’t been discovered. But it wasn’t reported this way. The Higgs, of course, does not invoke fear, anxiety or political disagreement (though please leave comments below if you disagree).

Lessons: Decision paralysis might be reduced by talking in terms of confidence rather than uncertainty. But perhaps more importantly…

4. People do accept the existence of risk
Finite worry and the problems of talking about uncertainty need not mean deadlock, James and Chris argued, because people do understand the concept of risk.  They accept there are irreducible uncertainties when making decisions. Businesses are particularly familiar with risk, of course. James mentioned that Harvard Business School is actively viewing climate change in this way:
“It’s striking that anyone frames this question in terms of ‘belief,’ saying things like, ‘I don’t believe in climate change,’… I think it’s better seen as a classic managerial question about decision-making under uncertainty.” — Forest L. Reinhardt, Business and Environment Institute faculty co-chair, HBS
Viewed in this way, the problem is not whether to make a decision based on uncertain or incomplete information, which is nearly always the case in other spheres (Chris: “Why should climate change be a special case required to have absolute certainty?”). The problem is whether the decision made is to bet against mainstream climate science:
“It seems clear that no one can know exactly what’s going to happen–the climate is a hugely complex system, and there’s a lot going on”….[The vast majority of the world’s scientists] may be wrong. But it seems to me foolish to bet that they are certainly wrong. — Rebecca Henderson, Business and Environment Institute faculty co-chair, HBS
Chris pointed out that the Technical Summary of the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment of climate science uses the word “uncertainty” a thousand times and the word “risk” not at all, so it is not surprising the media focus on uncertainty. And how well humans understand risk is a matter worthy of much discussion. But as James writes:
“There is… a growing body of literature suggesting that risk language may be a good, or at least a less bad, way of communicating climate change to the general public”. — “Climate Change in the Media: Reporting Risk and Uncertainty”, (Executive Summary, page viii)

Lessons: Where possible, talk in terms of risk not uncertainty; see for example the IPCC report on extreme weather and, naturally, our book Risk and Uncertainty Assessment for Natural Hazards.

5. Scientists have little training
Most of us are not well trained – perhaps hardly at all – in science communication. But we must consider how the way we present numbers affects their interpretation. In 2007, the IPCC said the likelihood that most of global warming since the mid-20th century was caused by greenhouse gas emissions was assessed to be greater than 90%. This year they made a similar statement but the likelihood was 95% or greater. Chris said that if a journalist asked, “What does it mean to increase from 90% confident to 95% confident?”, a scientist could make this clearer with “[We think] the chance climate change is natural is now half as likely as before.”

He also pointed out that we don’t have training in how to deal with the “street fight” of the climate debate. In my experience, this is one of the two main reasons why most of my colleagues do not do public engagement (the other being time commitment).

Lessons: For communicating uncertainty and risk, I recommend UnderstandingUncertainty.org. For dealing with the street fight, my advice is first to start with a lot of listening, not talking, to get a feel for the landscape. And to talk to climate scientists already engaging on how to avoid and deal with conflict (if, indeed, they are avoiding or dealing with conflict…).

6. Journalists have little (statistical) training
The IPCC assessment reports use a “language” of uncertainty, where phrases such as “extremely likely” are given a specific meaning (in this case, 95% or greater likelihood). But James said that only 15% of media articles about this year’s report explained the meaning of this uncertainty language.

And in the discussion someone quoted a journalist as saying “The IPCC report says it has 95% confidence – what do the other 5% of the scientists think?” In other words, confusing the idea of a consensus and a confidence interval. There was a laugh at this in the room. But I think this is easily done by people who do not spend all day thinking about statistics. That would be: the majority of the human race.

Lessons: Er, many journalists could benefit from more statistical training. Here is what that might look like.

7. “Newspaper editors are extremely shallow, generally”
Fiona, her tongue only slightly in cheek, gave us this memorably-made and disappointing (if predictable) point.

Just because something is important it doesn’t mean it will get into a news outlet. An editor might go to a cocktail party, talk to their glamorous celebrity friends, hear some current opinion, and then the next day their paper says…

In other words, the social diary – including meetings with high profile climate sceptics – can have a substantial influence on the viewpoint taken. (Of course, she noted, the editor of The Guardian is a profound man, not influenced by such superficiality). To counter this we would need to go to influential people and whisper in their ears too. We would need to launch a prawn cocktail offensive – or more appropriately, as one wit suggested, a goats cheese offensive. You heard it here first. And last.

Lessons: Go to more cocktail parties hosted by influential people.

8. There are many types of climate sceptic
There was generally support of scepticism by the speakers. Chris said it was perfectly valid for the public to ask scientists “Can we see your working?”; in other words, to ask for more details, code and data. All the speakers said they don’t use the word “denier”.

James said we should not generalise, and described four types of sceptic: trend, attribution, impacts, and policy. A trend sceptic would not be convinced there is global warming; an attribution sceptic about how much is man-made; an impacts sceptic might say we don’t know enough about when and how severe the impacts will be; and a policy sceptic would take issue with how to tackle the problem. (Personally, I believe there are as many types of sceptic as there are sceptics, but that would be a longer list to write down). Fiona pointed out that one person can be all these types of sceptic, moving from one argument to another as a discussion progresses. Some thought this would be incoherent (i.e. kettle logic, contradictory arguments) but others thought it could be coherent to be sceptical for more than one of those reasons.

Lessons: Treat each sceptic as an individual (flower); don’t assume they are one type of sceptic when they may be another, or more than one.

9. Trust is important 
What determines people’s views on climate change? As James pointed out, there is evidence that what drives opinions is not science, or even the media (they determine only the topics of discussion), but political, cultural and social values. Fiona had said earlier in the meeting, “Climate change is more politicised than ever before in my lifetime: it is becoming a matter of right or left. This is very, very scary. If you allow this, you lose any hope of doing anything sensible about it.”

All this is true. But I’ll end with a slightly more optimistic quote, which I think was from Chris: “The sea change in the battle with tobacco companies was when the message got across that the adverts were not trustworthy.” I quote this not because I believe it is the same as the climate debate, and not because sceptics are untrustworthy (though some may be), but because I (some might say, choose to) interpret it to mean that trust is important. When people trust the messenger, the message is more likely believed.

Lessons: Other things are important, but sometimes communication is a matter of trust. I emphasise this point because it’s what I already believe; others may disagree (politely, please…).

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I would have liked to add more references supporting the points made by the speakers, but ran out of time. Some are in James’ book mentioned above. Do please add them in the comments if you have them.

The title of this blogpost came from realising I had nine points to make and thinking of this set of shows curated by Robin Ince celebrating science, skepticism, and rationalism. If you’re in the UK this December, do go.

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This blog is written by Dr Tamsin Edwards, Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol and also features on her PLOS blog All Models Are Wrong.
Follow Tamsin on Twitter @flimsin

The nature of the beast – an APPCCG event on fracking and climate change

The term ‘fracking’ has a tendency to evoke strong feelings in many and the speakers at the APPCCG event were no different. As explained by the panel’s chair (Caroline Lucas the Green MP for Brighton Pavilion) the high level of enthusiasm for the exploration of shale gas across party lines in Westminster has led to concern. This concern is amongst not only those that question the safety of the technique itself but those who consider unconventional gas exploration/production to be counter intuitive to the UK’s attempts to reach its emission targets. Support for an early day moratorium on fracking (introduced by Caroline Lucas) has so far received support from a mere 25 MPs.

Fracking is a method used to release and extract unconventional gas. It involves injecting wells at high pressure with water, proppants, tracers and chemical additives to fracture the formation in which the gas is trapped. The technique is the subject of much controversy and it should be understood that the panel was structured in such a way that the speakers focussed on concerns surrounding fracking and consequently none were proponents of the technique.

The environmental concerns that accompany drilling and fracking for unconventional gas were impressed upon the panel with Dr Mariann Lloyd Smith (Of the National Toxics Network in Australia) emphasising that due to the ‘nature of the beast’ a safe industry was an idealists dream. The best that could be hoped for was a regulatory system that ensured a safer industry developed. Such feeling is echoed in the UNEP global environmental alert of 2012 which stated that not all fracking safety/environmental concerns could be removed through regulation. Some examples of the prominent concerns are the contents of not only fracking fluids but also drilling fluids. The chemical content of these fluids were described as a mixture of chemicals some of which have failed to be assessed in terms of their use in the fracking process. Even with the level of these chemicals composing a very low percentage of the fluids themselves, the level of chemicals (in kg) that remain in the ground can reach high levels. (For further details and figures from the Australian experience see http://www.ntn.org.au/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/NTN-Toxics-in-UG-Activities-Briefing.pdf). In addition to such chemicals the naturally occurring contaminants that can be released during the process are a cause for concern particularly as exposure pathways mean that such materials have the potential to cause damage to land, people and livestock.

It was not just health and environmental risks that were raised as prominent issues. The social costs of fracking and unconventional gas extraction were a key concern for many of the speakers. Eve McNamara (from the Ribble Estuary Against Fracking) emphasised that the community in West Lancashire have received no input from regulators and the authorities leaving them in a position where their only information resource is the actual company exploring for shale gas in the area, Cuadrilla. The lack of communication and consultation has meant that the only engagement the community has had with regulators has arisen from the proactive behaviour of REAF itself. The issue has sadly led to division in the community particularly in relation to the leasing of agricultural land where neighbouring farmers oppose the exploration for gas.

The protection of the public interest is not just a concern for the communities affected by fracking. Tony Bosworth (Friends of the Earth) emphasised that the upcoming planning guidance and Environment Agency guidance as well as the regulations on fracking need to be based on the precautionary principle and full public consultation with a full EIA conducted for every application. So far, the provision of information, consultation and explanation of how the public interest is being protected is considered by FOE to be a failure.

The question of whether the exploration and production of unconventional gas should be pursued in the UK is not only a question of environmental safety. Its implications for climate change and the UK’s emission targets are significant. Dr John Broderick (from the Tyndall Centre) emphasised that in seeking to reach our targets it is the cumulative emissions over a period of time that cause the degree of climate change we will experience.  It would seem that our probability of avoiding a greater than 2oC rise in temperature is already history. As such the use of unconventional gas as a ‘transition’ would mean that the continued consumption of fossil fuels would require a drastically higher annual reduction in emissions in the future to compensate, leaving little room for any future emissions from fossil fuels. Whilst the US experience has arguable shown that US coal emissions have decreased since the production of US shale gas, the US’s coal production has remained constant simply resulting in the export of coal. Unless shale gas can prove to be a true substitute leaving the coal in the ground, the argument for shale as a replacement loses its force.  Overall, Dr Broderick’s central point was that we need to focus on leaving more fossil fuel in the ground if we are to meet emission targets and as such shale gas is incompatible with this aim. It is clear that he is not alone in this consideration with FOE clearly taking the stance that fracking and unconventional gas are simply a risk we should not take.

So what does the future hold for fracking? Will communities receive greater information and support? Will a safer industry be enough to quell concerns and will our desire for domestic gas trump our desire to reach our emission targets?

This blog post is by Joanne Hawkins.
A PhD Researcher looking at the challenge of hydraulic fracturing: energy resilience, the environment and effective regulation at the University of Bristol Law School.

Joanne Hawkins, University of Bristol

Chasing Ice with the All Party Parliamentary Climate Change Group

Watching the film of a self-confessed reformed climate skeptic with members of parliament and Lords isn’t how I usually spend my Tuesday morning, but it was what I found myself doing last Tuesday. The occasion for this unlikely meeting was a special screening of photographer James Balog’s film Chasing Ice for the All Party Parliamentary Climate Change Group (APPCCG), of which the Cabot Institute is a member. The film, which documents the work of the photographer’s Extreme Ice Survey, follows James and his team on a journey to record the retreat of 13 glaciers across the globe continuously over a two year period. 

I won’t spoil the film too much (and strongly encourage you to see it if you can) but suffice to say placing 28 cameras at locations across the globe in some of the most difficult terrains and extremes of temperature is a challenge for both the men and technology involved. The aim to take one photo every hour of daylight for two years solid was massively ambitious, but worth the effort and the pain, as the result is a spectacular demonstration of how our hydrocarbon based economy is changing the face of the planet.

“What the public need […] is something spectacular that grabs people in the gut”
James Balog

James’s desire was to capture what is perhaps the most visually compelling effect of climate change. Retreating glaciers are a clear indication of the effects of rising global temperatures and one (despite the attempts by some to highlight the minority which are advancing) which is hard to ignore. Of course the glaciers highlighted in the film are only a small proportion of global land ice (which has the power to raise sea level) but can be seen as an important “canary in the coal mine” demonstrating the processes which are happening in the really large ice sheets too. Over the last twenty years, mass loss of ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica are estimated to have contributed 0.59 ±0.20 mm yr -1 to global sea level rise (Shepard et al., 2012). While that may seem like a small number, the effects over the next century could be dramatic, especially as, if last year’s unprecedented Greenland melt are anything to go by (
Tedesco et al., 2012), this rate could be accelerating.

“If you had an abscess in your tooth, would you go to dentist after dentist until one told you not to pull it out?”
James Balog
 

Before the screening there was an introduction to the film by Chris Shearlock, Sustainable Development Manager at The Co-operative Group who explained the Co-op’s involvement in the film, and their outlook on sustainable and ethical investment. The Co-op has invested £1billion in renewable energy, and he estimated that they have refused £300 million of investment opportunities in hydrocarbon extraction, and so when following the film, the questioning turned to exploitation of the soon-to-be summer sea ice free arctic the voice of the Co-operative was clear – that they will not be investing in hydrocarbon extraction. That question was dealt with very differently by Chris Barton, Head of International & Domestic Energy Security at the DECC who put forward the UK government’s current position that whilst we should reduce demand, in order to maintain cheap oil and gas for UK consumers “sensible” and regulated extraction in the arctic should be a priority for UK plc. What to do with the resulting CO2 emissions in order to hit the < 2 °C target? Well in Chris Barton’s mind carbon capture and storage will come to the rescue.

The debate moved to whether, as we are not an Arctic state, we can do anything about the regulation of commercial activity in a basin which is a combination of the territorial water of eight nation states, and open ocean controlled under the international law of the sea. The DECC view seemed to be that it is largely none of our business and out of our control, but interestingly Jane Rumble, Head of Polar Regions Unit at the FCO, had a different perspective. She suggested that we should be (and can be) working constructively through the Arctic Council, towards a similar regulatory framework to that which controls the other end of the Earth via the Antarctic Treaty, and by influencing Canada (one of the eight bordering nation states) through the commonwealth. Colin Manson, Director of Manson Oceanographic Consultancy and member of the IMO Polar Code working group spoke of the frustration of many in the shipping industry that talks on the Polar Code had stalled and encouraged UK intervention as a broker. He also pointed that one little talked about impacts of the opening up of the Northern Passage would be dramatic reductions in the time and fuel needed for bulk cargo shipping from the far east to Europe. With the representative routing of Shanghai – Rotterdam dropping to 5 weeks, vs the current 8 week route via the Indian Ocean. Colin, along I think with many in the audience, hoped thoughtful regulation and consideration of the impacts of this increased shipping through the arctic would come before it was too late.

Julia Slingo OBE, Chief Scientist at the Met Office closed proceedings with an impassioned plea to take care with the interpretation of our current generation of climate models following questions from the audience, and highlighted the importance of sustained development of what are our best hopes for accurate and precise predictions of future climate change.

All in all it was a fascinating day, and I was grateful to be exposed to a beautiful film, as well as an insight into the minds of those at the policy end of climate change science.

“We think we need new oil and gas production whether people like it or not”
Chris Barton, Head of International & Domestic Energy Security, DECC

This blog is by Dr Marcus Badger (Chemistry) at the University of Bristol
. He writes about the APPCCG meeting held on 5 March 2013.
Marcus Badger

All Party Parliamentary Climate Change Group – decarbonisation targets

This month’s All Party Parliamentary Climate Change Group (APPCCG) meeting centred on the age old problem of setting decarbonisation targets; the question being, are they useful milestones, or millstones around the necks of the energy industry.
David Kennedy, CCC
Joining the discussion at the meeting were several senior figures in the field, including David Kennedy, chief executive of the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), and until recently a frontrunner for the top civil service job at the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). Mr. Kennedy’s appearance at this meeting comes on the heels of an open letter presented by his organisation to Ed Davey, the minister at DECC, urging swifter action on establishing carbon intensity targets. Mr. Kennedy explained his concern that lingering doubt over whether legislative targets will be set dissuades investors in renewable energy technologies, and ultimately hampers efforts to decarbonise the electricity market.

It’s worth noting that the UK already has binding targets for reducing carbon emissions; indeed, it was the very first country to enact such legislation. However, these targets will ultimately be assessed only in 2050, which on the political timescale is several lifetimes away. Further, the 2008 Energy Act that carries this legislation allows successive governments to exceed carbon emission budgets in the short run, so long as they reduce future budgets accordingly. Without intervening milestones between now and 2050, one can certainly see an incentive for incumbent governments to neglect decarbonisation- procrastination on a national scale.

Opposing this view was David Hone, the climate change advisor for Shell. Mr. Hone explained that UK energy policy should not be viewed as a closed system- indeed, our policy is linked directly to those of our European partners though EU-ETS, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. His view was that by enacting further legislation, the government would be unfairly constricting energy producers in the UK. Further, any emissions savings made in the UK could be offset by additional emissions in Europe, as the EU-ETS would simply sell emissions rights elsewhere.

Guy Newey, Policy Exchange
Another significant contribution was made by Guy Newey, Head of Environment and Energy at the think tank Policy Exchange. While Mr. Newey agreed in principle with the idea of bringing forward decisions on decarbonisation targets to 2014, he also made the point that uncertainty on this topic was a significant disincentive to investors, and that a quick and firm resolution to this question was essential; to that end, he could live with an imperfect answer.

This blog is written by Neeraj Oak, University of Bristol

Neeraj Oak

Neeraj Oak reports on the APPCCG meeting on the UK Energy Bill

Ever since the birth of commercial nuclear power at Calder Hall, Cumbria in 1954, fission-based reactors have been an important part of the UK energy mix. Today, policy makers stand at a crossroads. Increasing demand for electricity and the constraints of carbon reduction treaties are forcing the government to consider renewal and expansion of our existing nuclear power generation capacity. At the same time, the old spectres of safety, cost and nuclear waste still haunt the industry.

I was recently lucky enough to attend a meeting hosted by the APPCCG and NCG on the current UK Energy Bill and its relation to new nuclear generation capacity. Among the large number of attendees were  Hergen Haye (head of new nuclear, DECC),  Dr. Nigel Knee (head of nuclear policy, EDF energy), former Green Party leader Caroline Lucas MP as well as representatives of academia, trade unions and environmental organisations. The meeting was chaired by Joan Walley MP (Labour). Interestingly, the only major party not represented at this meeting were the conservatives, which left the burden of defending government policy to the DECC.

Points of contention at the moment are numerous, but a few do stand out. The government appears not to be upholding its commitment not to subsidise nuclear energy, at least in the eyes of the Green Party and present academics. The current energy bill details a change in the subsidy mechanism for low-carbon energy sources, known as the contract-for-difference feed-in tariff (CfD). While CfD is openly referred to as a subsidy in the renewable energy industry, the fact that the nuclear energy industry is also eligible for its benefits has raised significant criticism.

The time and cost of constructing nuclear power stations was also in the spotlight, with special ire reserved for EDF’s ongoing EPR reactor project at Flamanville in France, which is currently 4 years behind schedule and is projected to cost more that €8.5 billion despite initial estimated cost of €3.3 billion. Further, such time and cost overruns have been alarmingly common in Europe in recent years. The preferred configuration for new nuclear in the UK is similar to that of Flamanville, an EPR reactor administered by EDF. There were calls, especially from academics, for other options to be tabled.

Finally, in the wake of the Fukushima crisis, safety and disposal of nuclear waste are also raising considerable concern. With the commitment of Germany to a nuclear-free energy sector, the possibility of the UK following suit is slightly more likely. However, this will depend on how this change affects Germany’s progress towards carbon-reduction targets. It’s too early to say, but for now it appears as though the government will look to retain the status quo, renewing nuclear generation capacity without necessarily expanding it.  This leaves environmentalists opposed to nuclear energy in somewhat of a dilemma, as they must choose between supporting new nuclear energy, or siding with more carbon-intensive alternatives until renewable energy technologies mature.

Neeraj Oak

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Blog entry by Neeraj Oak
Bristol Centre for Complexity Science (BCCS)
Neeraj.Oak@bristol.ac.uk
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Negotiating climate change politics in Parliament

Blog post by Karen Bell, Bristol School for Policy Studies

The All Party Parliamentary Climate Change Group (APPCCG) is a coalition of 150 MPs from all parties, as well as almost 200 representatives of a variety of businesses, NGOs, academic institutions, and embassies.   Its registered aim is ‘To raise awareness of the threat of climate change and to promote policies to counter that threat’ (Register of All Party Groups, 2012).  This involves discussing the practical strategies, at national and international level, for enabling the UK and the rest of the world to mitigate and adapt to climate change.  The current Chair of the Committee is the Labour parliamentarian, Joan Walley MP, who also heads the Environmental Audit Committee. The Secretariat of the APPCCG is the Carbon Neutral Company, a business which has ‘…pioneered the carbon offset industry’ (Carbon Neutral Company, 2012).

On 11th September 2011, I attended an important meeting of this group on behalf of the Cabot Institute. The meeting began with Joan Walley MP explaining the importance of the meeting, in terms of contributing to the upcoming 18th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) at Doha.  She said that, in the past, the APPCCG had identified disconnects between policy, business and government and that it was necessary to look at how to close these gaps.  She asked us to consider how the aspiration to be ‘the greenest government ever’ was reflected in our policies.  Following this, she introduced the panel:  Gregory Barker MP, DECC Minister; Mark Simmonds MP, newly appointed Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office; Ruth Davis, Senior Policy Advisor to Greenpeace UK; Pete Betts, Director, International Climate Change, DECC; and Mark Kenber, Chief Executive Officer of the Climate Group, a non-profit organisation.

Ruth Davis of Greenpeace, the first speaker, emphasised that climate change has structural causes and so international climate change negotiations are complex and need to be carried out over a long time period.  She spoke of the necessity for cross party consensus so that policy remains consistent over time.

DECC Minister, Gregory Barker MP, said that, despite the difficulties in previous climate change negotiations, there was still a glimmer of hope for the upcoming Doha talks.  He said he considered the UNFCCC process was our best chance to deliver a global agreement by working towards a single, legally binding instrument to control climate change.  Praising Pete Bett’s negotiating skills, he remarked how difficult these meetings were, not only because of the influence of geo-politics, but also individual egos. However, he felt that the UK was held in very high esteem because of its role in the negotiations and was hopeful because, at the last major UNFCCC talks in Durban we ‘agreed to agree’ that there should be a global treaty by 2015.  However, he was concerned about the rift between developed and developing countries on these issues.  He spoke of the 100 billion dollars promised for adaptation and mitigation, stating that this should not be seen as a grant since some of this money would be a result of developing countries mobilising private sector capital.  Further, he considered that the transition to a low carbon economy should be seen as an opportunity and a spur to growth and innovation.

Mark Simmonds, MP, then went on to say that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was a significant player in bringing forward the climate change agenda around the world.  He considered that it was important to explain to developing countries that a low carbon economy can go alongside economic growth.  Supporting Greg Barker, MP’s view, he stated that the need to reduce emissions was an opportunity for UK business to help developing countries to transition, by exporting innovation, expertise and finance.  He said that the UK had been leaders in inspiring other countries.  For example the Mexican government had put in place a climate change act modelled on that of the UK and South Korea’s emissions trading scheme is a result of significant UK input.

Peter Betts emphasised that the window of opportunity to ensure global warming is kept to below 2 degrees (2C) is getting smaller.  This target was agreed at the 2010 Copenhagen UNFCCC talks in order to avoid runaway, and potentially devastating, climate change.  Peter Betts considered that the 2C goal was a ‘sensitive issue’ for China and ‘China is doing a lot but the numbers suggest they would need to almost do more than anyone else to meet that goal’.  He also stated that it was proving a challenge to mobilise private finance to help reduce climate change.

Mark Kenber  said there was huge enthusiasm about what could be achieved at the COP meetings but that negotiations continue to focus on cost.  The situation must be seen as an opportunity for business.

After the panel had spoken, there was little time left for contributions from the other seventy or more attendees.  Four comments/questions made were in the remaining time:

  • Whether or not we are meeting our emissions targets depends if we are working on production or consumption based accounting.  Our emissions are moving elsewhere.
  • We need to monitor all sustainability issues and bring in across the board sustainability reporting.  There is an emphasis on carbon to the exclusion of other environmental issues and this risks policy responses creating problems in other environmental domains.
  • One of the negotiating blocks was that developing countries were asking for historic emissions to be taken into account.
  • Its very important to talk about the science in the negotiations, because we now may be looking at 4 degrees warming (I think this meant we are headed for 4 degrees, not that the target should be 3 degrees).

The panel replied to these comments by saying it would not be practical to introduce consumption based accounting; that we ‘want to get into emissions trading’; and that we need to persuade developing societies that  growth economic and environmental protection were mutually reinforcing.

I did not contribute to the discussion, partly because there was so little time for comments from the floor, but mainly because my own opinions about the practical solutions to climate change are so completely different to those expressed that I could not see how I could begin to make a case within the one or two sentences that appeared permissible.   I found the emphasis on market solutions; ‘persuading’ developing countries; the dependence on private enterprise to find emissions reduction a profitable enterprise; and the insistence on the need to continue to pursue growth, ideas that are both disturbing and difficult to confront (being the dominant discourse in the UK). Continuing growth is not sensible, or even possible, because resources, in particular fossil fuels, are unlikely to last another 100 years and the capacity of the environment to cope with our waste is also reaching its limits.  Most of the panel members seemed intent on promoting climate catastrophe as a business opportunity, so increasing the focus on technical and market-based solutions.  Many of these ‘solutions’ have proved ineffective and/or potentially very harmful e.g. emissions trading, geo-engineering and nuclear power  The kind of policies that might actually help in the current situation where not mentioned or dismissed outright e.g. reduced consumption by the world’s wealthy; large financial transfers from North to South in order to finance adaptation and mitigation costs; safe, clean and community-led renewable energy; resource conservation that enforces Indigenous land rights; organic and sustainable agriculture; free public transport; and food sovereignty.  Further elaboration of these points can be found in my articles and conference papers, e.g.  http://montreal.degrowth.org/downloads/papers/S018_Bell.pdf

Though frustrating, it is important for those of us who are interested in socially and environmentally just solutions to the problem of climate change to continue to engage in these events.  We need to increase awareness of how damaging bogus strategies can be, and continue to propose a genuine project to increase the well-being of all.