Climate summits are too big and key voices are being crowded out – here’s a better solution

Conference room at COP28
Conference room at COP28

Every year, the official UN climate summits are getting bigger. In 2021 at COP26 in Glasgow there were around 40,000 participants, COP27 in 2022 in Sharm el-Sheikh had 50,000.

But this year blew all previous records out of the water. More than 97,000 participants had badges to attend COP28 in Dubai in person. This raises questions about who is attending COPs and what they are doing there, who gets their voices heard and, on a more practical note, how this affects the negotiations.

For those not familiar with the COP setup, there are two “worlds” that exist side by side. One is the negotiations, which are run under the UN’s climate change body the UNFCCC, and the other is a very long list of talks and social events. These take place in pavilion exhibition spaces and are open to anyone attending, in contrast to the negotiations which are often closed to the media and sometimes closed to observers.

There is a stark difference between these worlds, with pavilion spaces featuring elaborate and inviting settings, particularly if they are well funded, while negotiations often happen in windowless rooms.

A growing sense exists among those invested in the “traditional” side of the COPs that many delegates have no intention of observing the climate talks themselves, and instead spend their time networking in the pavilions.

Indigenous people visiting COP28 from Brazilian Amazon.
Indigenous people visiting COP28 from Brazilian Amazon.

In terms of who attends, at COP28 there were around 25,000 “party” (country) delegates, 27,000 “party overflow” delegates (usually guests, sponsors, or advisors), 900 UNFCCC secretariat members (who run the COPs), 600 “UN overflow”, and 1,350 from “specialised agencies” such as the World Health Organization or World Bank and their overflows. That makes up just under 55,000 or half of the attendees.

The rest are intergovernmental organisations (2,000), UN Global Climate Action award winners (600), host country guests (5,000), temporary passes (500 – many issued to big private companies), NGOs (14,000 – including one of us, as part of a university delegation), and media (4,000). This is according to the UNFCCC, which places the number of attendees closer to 80,000.

The “party overflow” badges are particularly concerning. The number of delegates connected to the oil and gas industries has quadrupled from last year to around 2,400, many of whom were invited as part of country delegations. As another example, meat industry representatives became part of Brazil’s delegation, while dairy associations organised official COP side events. In the official programme, the Energy and Industry, Just Transition, and Indigenous Peoples Day featured more events by industrial giant Siemens than by indigenous people.

Practically speaking, huge numbers cause problems – this year for example there were delayed meetings, long queues, and several negotiation rooms were beyond capacity with observers and even party delegates asked to limit their numbers and leave.

Even with access to an observer badge, there is little one can contribute to negotiations. The negotiating positions are decided long before the COPs begin, and observers are rarely permitted to speak in negotiations. In addition, a lot of the negotiations are either conducted behind closed doors (called “informal-informals” with no access for the UN or observers) or even in the corridors, where negotiators meet informally to cement positions. The negotiations you can (silently) observe are usually a series of prepared statements, rather than a discussion.

So if COPs are too big and bloated, what is the alternative?

Smaller and more online

One alternative is being a virtual delegate, which one of us tried. This year’s COP trialled live streams and recordings of some of the negotiations, side events and press conferences on an official UNFCCC virtual platform for the first time. The option is a long overdue, but welcome addition. It reduces travel emissions and makes it more accessible, for instance for people with caring responsibilities and others who are unable to travel (or perhaps who refuse to fly).

Some technical teething problems are to be expected. Yet when we queried why the virtual platform didn’t livestream many of the sessions, the COP28 support team pointed us to the official COP28 app. Our employer, the University of Bristol, had advised us not to download the app because of security concerns, which again raises serious issues around transparency and accountability in UNFCCC spaces, as well as freedom of speech and assembly in COP host countries.

Not being there in person also has downsides. As a virtual observer, it’s harder to judge the atmosphere in a negotiation room, to stumble upon and observe spontaneous negotiations happening in corridors, or participate in or observe protests. While indigenous voices were rarely heard in the livestreamed negotiations and events, the Indigenous People’s Pavilion offered a chance to hear them – but only if you were in Dubai. The virtual alternative is a good option to observe negotiations, but it means missing out on some of the civil society lifeblood of COP.

Another option is to limit access to COPs – for example, limiting the in-person negotiations only to the most vital participants. Party tickets could be limited, with lobbyists from fossil fuel industries tightly controlled and priority given to climate victims, indigenous communities and underrepresented countries. Side events and pavilions could take place a few months before the COPs, increasing the chances of influencing negotiations, since positions are cemented early. There is no reason these only need to happen in one place once a year, there could be regional meetups in between, allowing for formal contact more often.

These issues of access, transparency and influence have serious implications on negotiation outcomes and climate action. After undergoing various draft iterations that offered options ranging from “no text” to “phasing out” or “down” fossil fuels, this year’s final agreement does not include a commitment to phasing out. This watered-down agreement reflects the inability of indigenous peoples and the most climate vulnerable countries to meaningfully participate in the negotiations – future COPs must trim down to make their voices heard.

 


This blog is written by Cabot Institute for the Environment members, Drs Alix Dietzel, Senior Lecturer in Climate Justice, University of Bristol and Katharina Richter, Lecturer in Climate Change, Politics and Society, University of Bristol.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Katharina Richter
Dr Katharina Richter
Dr Alix Dietzel
Dr Alix Dietzel

Degrowth isn’t the same as a recession – it’s an alternative to growing the economy forever

lovelyday12/shutterstock

The UK economy unexpectedly shrank by 0.3% in March, according to the Office of National Statistics. And though the country is likely to narrowly avoid an official recession in 2023, just as it did the previous year, the economy is projected to hit the worst growth rates since the Great Depression, and the worst in the G7.

For many people, this certainly feels like a recession, with food prices soaring and pay falling dramatically below inflation meaning many people are having to reduce their standard of living.

Against this backdrop, the main political parties are focused on delivering economic growth for a better future. One of Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s five priorities for 2023 is simply “growing the economy”, while opposition leader Keir Starmer has pledged to turn the UK into the fastest growing G7 economy.

Sunak and Starmer’s priorities reflect conventional economic wisdom that “growth, growth, growth” increases incomes and standards of living, employment and business investment. When the economy doesn’t grow, we see unemployment, hardship and inequality.

Growth cannot solve everything

However, economic growth on its own is not going to solve these multiple and intersecting crises, as it only counts the total value of goods and services produced without measuring qualitative change – whether this stuff makes you feel happy or secure.

TVs in a shop
GDP measures things not feelings.
Luckies / shutterstock

In contrast, an increasing number of policymakers, thinkers and activists argue for abandoning our obsession with growth at all costs. Instead of pursuing GDP growth, they suggest orienting the economy towards social equality and wellbeing, environmental sustainability and democratic decision making. The most far reaching of those proposals are made under the umbrella term of degrowth.

Degrowth is a set of ideas and a social movement that presents a comprehensive solution to these issues. The pandemic demonstrated that a new normal can be achieved at pace, as we saw sweeping changes to how many of us lived, worked, and travelled.

At the time, headlines equated the pandemic-related GDP squeeze with the perceived “misery of degrowth”. With persistently high inflation rates and the cost of living still spiralling, these debates are going to resurface.

Degrowth is not the same as shrinking GDP

To begin with, degrowth is not the same as negative GDP growth. Instead, degrowth envisions a society in which wellbeing does not depend on economic growth and the environmental and social consequences of its pursuit. Degrowth proposes an equitable, voluntary reduction of overconsumption in affluent economies.

Equally important is to shift the economy away from the ecologically and socially harmful idea that producing more stuff is always good. Instead, economic activity could focus on promoting care, cooperation and autonomy, which would also increase wellbeing and give people a bigger say in how their lives are run.

Yet, for many people the word smacks of misery and the type of frugality they are trying to escape from during the cost of living crisis.

But degrowth, if successfully achieved, would arguably feel better than a recession or a cost-of-living crisis. Here are three reasons why:

1. Degrowth is democratic

The first is the undemocratic and unplanned nature of a recession or cost-of-living crisis. Most citizens would agree, for example, that they had little to no control over the deregulation of the finance industry, and subsequent boom in sub-prime mortgage lending and derivatives trading that caused the 2008/09 financial crash.

Cranes in skyline
Things would still be built – but not just to satisfy a need for growth.
Oleg Totskyi / shutterstock

Degrowth, on the other hand, is a profoundly democratic project. It emphasises direct democracy and deliberation, which means citizens can shape which economic sectors are decreased and by how much, and which ones will grow and by how much.

One example of such a democratic endeavour is the Climate Assembly UK, whose 108 members were selected through a civic lottery process and were broadly representative of the population. After listening to expert testimony, the assembly issued a number of recommendations to support the UK’s net zero climate target. Over a third of all members prioritised support for sustainable growth. Economic growth itself was not among the top 25 priorities.

2. Degrowth would be egalitarian

Recessions, especially when coupled with fiscal austerity, tend to amplify existing inequalities by hitting the poorest members of society first, including women, working-class communities and ethnic minorities.

Degrowth drastically differs from a recession because it is a redistributive project. For instance, a universal basic income), an unconditional monthly state payment to all citizens, is a popular policy with degrowthers.

The degrowth vision is that basic income should guarantee a dignified living standard, remunerate unpaid care, and provide access to healthcare, food and accommodation for those in need. It could be financed by “climate income” schemes that tax carbon and return revenues to the public.

3. Degrowth wouldn’t hinder climate action

In an economy reliant on growth, a recession is generally bad news for the environment.

For instance, for the UK to hit its net zero targets, it must make annual public investments of between £4 billion and £6 billion by 2030. A recession would threaten public spending as well as the confidence investors have in low carbon developments in transport, housing or energy.

But such investments do not have to depend on growth but could instead be made through collective and democratic decisions to make climate action a priority. Carbon taxes will play a large part in this, as will stopping fossil fuel subsidies like the £3.75 billion tax break granted to develop the Rosebank oil and gas field in the sea north of Scotland.

To make sure we stay within the environmental limits within which we can safely operate, sometimes known as our planetary boundaries, degrowth suggests democratically establishing limits on resource use. For example, global greenhouse gas emissions or non-renewable energy use could be capped at a given level, and decline annually.

Sharing these resource “caps” among the population would ensure that while we stay within these safe environmental spaces, everyone has equitable access to the resources required to lead a fulfilling life. In contrast to the pursuit of endless growth, degrowth puts both climate action and human wellbeing at its heart.The Conversation


This blog is written by Cabot Institute for the Environment member, Dr Katharina Richter, Lecturer in Climate, Politics and Society, University of Bristol. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Katharina Richter
Dr Katharina Richter

After COP27, is 1.5C still alive?

Try booking a train on Boxing Day in the UK and you’ll soon find out that none are running. Well, not entirely. One small railway line managed by indomitable Gauls still holds out: The Eurostar. And airports are still being served as plains are still flying. Obvs. If this is not just the present, but also our future, then Mia Mottley, Prime Minister of Barbados, is right: “We’re at 1.2 degrees now. If in 5 years we’re at 1.5, then we’re…. we’re…. I won’t use that word now.”

Apologies, I got carried away. Back to planes (flying), trains (not running) and automobiles (driving). These are symptomatic of the mess we’re in, but nothing compared to the mess we’re heading towards. And nothing compared to the mess others already find themselves in. If these current trends continues the number of refugees is set to increase from 21m in 2022 to 1bn in 2050 (Mia Mottley again). Many originate from Africa which is responsible for only 4% of global emissions (and 2% of historic emissions) and home to 600m without access to electricity.

While inanimate capital moves freely across borders, refugees are increasingly prevented from doing so. As their poverty and desperation grows in a warming world, their cost of borrowing increases as the World Bank uses per capita income as a proxy for borrowing conditions. Consequently, such countries (Least Developed Countries – LDCs) borrow at 12-14% while rich countries (the G7) borrow at 1-4%. According to Indian economist Joyashree Roy, these countries need 7% growth per year to escape their plight but if they are borrowing at +10% cost of capital, this growth will not be powered by renewables.

Neither will the focusing on the supply of renewables alone deliver Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Demand-side interventions are necessary to shift investment patterns and create new economic opportunities that are synergistic with SDGs. But all this depends on infrastructure access and empowerment to make the right choices, which in turn are determined by the flow of finance. To put on track for 1.5C, these flows need to quadruple to $4-6trn per year, according to Macky Sall, Senegalese President and current Chairperson of the African Union. IPCC Chair Hoesung Lee, goes one step further: access to capital is the key determinant of limiting global warming to 1.5C. Concessional access to finance was provided during COVID, as Mia Mottley pointed out, so why can it not be provided to prevent climate catastrophe?

Dr Colin Nolden (left) at COP27 with IPCC Chair Hoesung Lee and Dr Alix Dietzel

On the plus side, outgoing COP26 President Alok Sharma suggests that 90% of global emissions are covered by a net zero target. Almost 1/3rd of the global population who accumulate 55% of global GDP are covered by Emissions Trading Schemes, according to Stefano de Clara, Head of the International Carbon Action Partnership. Then again, the current average carbon price stands at $6/t. This needs to increase to $75/t by 2030 to limit warming to 2C, not to mention 1.5C, according to Dora Benedek from the International Monetary Fund.

Without such a massive increase in the cost of carbon, emissions are expected to be only 12% (6GtCO2eq) lower in 2030 compared to today. What about magic??, you might interject at this point. Current Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and Direct Air Capture (DAC) capacities amount to around 4 hours of global emissions and are projected to amount to around 16 hours in 2030, according to Sven Teske from the University of Technology Sydney. To keep 1.5C alive, we need to reduce emissions by 30-50% in by 2030 (Dora Benedek again). So yes to magic, but only within the bounds of Kate Raworth’s famous doughnut.

And it’s both sides of that tasty doughnut that we need to bear in mind. On the outside, quick wins are possible regarding methane emissions which are responsible for around 0.5C of the 1.2C we stand above pre-industrial levels. Around 0.1C of warming can be addressed by cutting gas flaring and coal related methane emissions at no cost, according to US Deputy Climate Envoy Richard Duke. Addressing such emissions deliver invaluable co-benefits on the inside. 15% of all deaths (7million a year) are due to polluted air, according to Jane Burston of the Clean Air Fund. Companies are having to pay a pollution premium to attract talent to polluted cities.

It’s both the out and the in-side of the doughnut we need to focus on for a just transition to happen. According to Heike Henn, of Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action and whatnot, Article 6 is emerging as the mechanism to allocate those $100bn/a finance pledged in Paris which never materialised as well as the trillions needed to implement NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions) and SDGs.

Not Article 6.2 though, which requires adjustments in GHG registries upon the transfer of a carbon credits (Internationally Transferrable Mitigation Outcome – ITMO) and is already seeing emerging economies lowering ambition in their NDCs. Article 6.4 is what I’m talking about. Although it will take years to be operationalised, its infrastructure is being developed as we speak. The Climate Action Data Trust, for example, can significantly lower transaction costs of carbon market transactions through automated Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) and tokenisation to create digital carbon assets.

Now it’s down to ambitious countries to form alliances and agree on a sharing mechanism to convert the 1.5C target into demand for mitigation action distributed dynamically over time, and measure achievement and contribution using Article 6.4. “Getting to net zero is a heroic task”, according to Dirk Forrister of the International Emissions Trading Association, “and you won’t get there by going alone”.

Where does this leave 1.5C? “I find it hard to stay optimistic”, said Nichola Sturgeon on day 1 of COP27. I echo this sentiment. Yet we need to remind ourselves that the combined net zero targets, if implemented, can limit warming to 1.7C and increase, yes INCREASE, global GDP by 0.4% per year, according to Fatih Birol from the IEA. If we can’t sort this out, bins will be burning.

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This blog was written by Cabot Institute for the Environment member Dr Colin Nolden, Bristol Law School, University of Bristol.

Colin Nolden

 

 

Mock COP26: Convincing, Cooperating and Collaborating

 

Glasgow COP26 presentation, preliminary discussion, and negotiation rounds 1 & 2

On 11th November at 10am around 60 A-level students from schools across Bristol gathered to participate in this year’s Mock COP26, hosted by Jack Nicholls, Emilia Melville, and Camille Straatman from the Cabot Institute for the Environment. After a resounding success from the first Mock COP, which took place online in March 2021, there was real excitement and anticipation building for the in-person event which would be held in the Great Hall of the Wills Memorial Building.

The morning kicked off with an engaging presentation by Jack, Emilia, and Camille, outlining the objectives of the upcoming COP26 in Glasgow. There had been much discussion surrounding the COP in the public sphere in the prior weeks, so it was interesting to see a summary of where things stand in the time since the Paris Agreement and what the potential outcomes of this COP may be.

The negotiations began with preliminary intra-group discussions, facilitated by a group of 12 postgraduate students. Each group defined their stance on each of the COP resolutions, ranging from option A, the most radical response, to C, the most conservative. It was evident from the off that these students were highly knowledgeable and passionate about the environmental, sociological, and economic impacts of each resolution, and as a result, each group wasted no time in prioritising the resolutions that would benefit their actor the most. Brazil factored in its current economic and development situation, as well as the Amazon’s critical role in the ecosystem balance, choosing to prioritise climate finance, natural protection and conservation and protecting climate refugees. For the International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change (IIFPCC), giving protected status to 50% of Earth’s natural areas by 2050 was defined as the most important resolution, whereas Shell chose to focus on phasing out coal, with the understanding that this would take the onus off the oil industry. Each group presented their ideal resolutions in a clear and concise manner.

The atmosphere really started to build in the hall when the first round of negotiations began. China faced Greenpeace in a heated discussion on coal usage while the IIFPCC negotiated with the USA on protecting indigenous populations. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees found alignment with Brazil on many of the resolutions, namely achieving net-zero emissions by 2050, natural protection and conservation to 30% of Earth’s natural areas and protecting climate refugees. In round two of negotiations, we saw Shell and the International Monetary Fund categorically disagree on the timeline for transition to Zero Emissions Vehicles, eventually compromising on a B resolution to have all new vehicle sales as zero-emission by 2040. Brazil was happy in supporting the IIPFCC in resolution 7a. (All countries must allow people fleeing from natural disasters, environmental degradation, and sea level rise to enter their countries and make their new homes there). Brazil and IIPFCC made an alliance to encourage USA toward resolution 7a, instead of their preferred 7b (Countries at risk of extinction from sea level rise should be provided with new land to settle and move their people to OR be provided with financial help to buy land in other nations). China and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) clash on coal usage, with AOSIS pushing back with a suggestion of image control, but ultimately China held strong on their decision.

Negotiation rounds 3 & 4, voting, and deputy mayor’s speech

The UK showed their tactical abilities and their knowledge in the negotiations with Greenpeace, but Greenpeace did not cede to their demands and manage to agree to a deal.  The IIPFCC was determined to protect indigenous land and communities, but their quest was heavily challenged by Shell. There was no common ground in the negotiation with this petrol giant, so the IIPFCC had to ensure an allyship with Brazil if they wanted to ensure the protection of the indigenous. On round four, Shell tried to sway some votes from China and Sweden, but while agreements were found with the former, the latter country was not going to let Shell influence their values. The tête-à-tête became lively as neither Shell nor Sweden were willing to compromise, resulting in a rather unsuccessful attempt of finding complicity.

After four intense rounds of negotiating, the voting began. Were all parties going to remain faithful to the agreements established during the negotiations? Or would some throw a curve ball, changing their minds at the last minute? The pondered tactics of the IIPFCC were successful, as they managed to lock Brazil’s and the USA’s support on their most valued resolutions. All parties pondered thoroughly on how to best use their votes, and it seemed that this meant that some agreements had been silently retracted, when some astonished reactions followed the raise of hands here and there.

The conference was finally over and many parties, including Brazil and Greenpeace, could celebrate the victory of the resolutions agreed upon. Yet, it was clear that a bittersweet aftertaste was left in the mouths of some parties, who did not manage to persuade enough. The heated debate had ended, and what was done was done, but one more surprise was awaiting our participants. Deputy Mayor Asher Craig had been sitting on the sidelines for a few instances already, assisting in the final yet most heated rounds of the conference. She was there, observing our pupils in awe as they got into character and avidly fought for their beliefs. The Deputy Mayor was impressed by the passion of these young minds and how much they are invested in the cause; she was proud to see that young generations care about the environment and our planet, as they came up with ideas for change that they would like to see more in the Bristol. The innovativeness and creativity of the students was remarkable in her eyes, as she proceeded to give an inspiring and uplifting speech on the efforts currently being made by the City Council to respond to the climate emergency. The mock COP26 was a more than a successful event, and as everyone waited for the results of the conference in Glasgow, we all wished that our simulation had been real.

Watch the students in action in this short video created by Particle Productions and funded by Bristol City Council.

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This blog is written by Sonia Pighini and Jennifer Malone, who are students on the Cabot Institute for the Environment Master’s by Research.

Jennifer Malone
Currently studying for a Master’s by Research in Global  Environmental Challenges from the Cabot Institute for the Environment, Jennifer’s research is centred on food system decarbonisation within the scope of UK food policy and community practice.
Sonia Pigini

Sonia is an international student in the MscR programme Global Environmental Challenges. Their research focuses on people-centred sustainable food system transitions in Bristol. They are particularly interested in exploring the potential for a more decentralised food system in the city, which empowers local producers, engages consumers and that keeps aspects such as justice and inclusion at its heart.

Image credit (image at top of blog): Jack Pitts

Tyre Extinguishers: activists are deflating SUV tyres in the latest pop-up climate movement

JARUEK_CH/Shutterstock

A new direct action group calling itself the Tyre Extinguishers recently sabotaged hundreds of sports utility vehicles (SUVs) in various wealthy parts of London and other British cities. Under cover of darkness, activists unscrewed the valve caps on tyres, placed a bean or other pulse on the valve and then returned the cap. The tyres gently deflated.

Why activists are targeting SUVs now can tell us as much about the failures of climate policy in the UK and elsewhere as it can about the shape of environmental protest in the wake of Extinction Rebellion and Insulate Britain.

The “mung bean trick” for deflating tyres is tried and tested. In July 2008, the Oxford Mail reported that up to 32 SUVs were sabotaged in a similar way during nocturnal actions in three areas of the city, with anonymous notes left on the cars’ windscreens.

In Paris in 2005, activists used bicycle pumps to deflate tyres, again at night, again in affluent neighbourhoods, again leaving anonymous notes. In both cases, activists were careful to avoid causing physical damage. Now it’s the Tyre Extinguishers who are deflating SUV tyres.

In the early 2000s, SUVs were still a relative rarity. But by the end of 2010s, almost half of all cars sold each year in the US and one-third of the cars sold in Europe were SUVs.

In 2019, the International Energy Agency reported that rising SUV sales were the second-largest contributor to the increase in global CO₂ emissions between 2010 and 2018 after the power sector. If SUV drivers were a nation, they would rank seventh in the world for carbon emissions.

At the same time, the Tyre Extinguishers’ DIY model of activism has never been easier to propagate. “Want to get involved? It’s simple – grab some leaflets, grab some lentils and off you go! Instructions on our website,” chirps the group’s Twitter feed.

Changing activist strategy

Though the actions led by the Tyre Extinguishers have numerous precedents, the group’s recent appearance in the UK’s climate movement does mark a change of strategy.

Extinction Rebellion (XR), beginning in 2018, hoped to create an expanding wave of mobilisations to force governments to introduce new processes for democratically deciding the course of climate action. XR attempted to circumvent existing protest networks, with its message (at least initially) aimed at those who did not consider themselves activists.

In contrast, activists in the Tyre Extinguishers have more in common with groups that have appeared after XR, such as Insulate Britain, whose members blockaded motorways in autumn 2021 to demand government action on the country’s energy inefficient housing. These are what we might call pop-up groups, designed to draw short-term media attention to specific issues, rather than develop broad-based, long-lasting campaigns.

After a winter of planning, climate activists are likely to continue grabbing headlines throughout spring 2022. XR, along with its sister group, Just Stop Oil, threaten disruption to UK oil refineries, fuel depots and petrol stations. Their demands are for the government to stop all new investments in fossil fuel extraction.

An industrial scene with three cooling towers and various chimneys lit up with yellow lights.
UK-based activists have threatened to block oil refineries in April 2022.
Orxy/Shutterstock

The Tyre Extinguishers explicitly targeted a specific class of what they consider anti-social individuals. Nevertheless, that the group’s action is covert and (so far at least) sporadic is itself telling.

In his book How to Blow up a Pipeline, Lund University professor of human ecology Andreas Malm asked at what point climate activists will stop fetishising absolute non-violence and start campaigns of sabotage. Perhaps more important is the question that Malm doesn’t ask: at what point will the climate movement be strong enough to be able to carry out such a campaign, should it choose to do so?

Given the mode of action of the Tyre Extinguishers, the answer on both counts is: almost certainly not yet.

The moral economy of SUVs

For now, the Tyre Extinguishers will doubtless be sustained by red meat headlines in the right-wing press. It’s still probable, however, that the group will deflate almost as quickly as it popped up: this is, after all, what has happened with similar groups in the past.

The fact that activists are once again employing these methods speaks to the failure of climate policy. Relatively simple, technical measures taken in the early 2000s would have solved the problem of polluting SUVs before it became an issue. The introduction of more stringent vehicle emissions regulations, congestion charging, or size and weight limits, would have stopped the SUV market in its tracks.

SUVs are important because they are so much more than metal boxes. Matthew Paterson, professor of international politics at the University of Manchester, argues that the connection between freedom and driving a car has long been an ideological component of capitalism.

And Matthew Huber, professor of geography at Syracuse University in the US, reminds readers in his book Lifeblood that oil is not just an energy source. It generates ways of being which become culturally and politically embedded, encouraging individualism and materialism.

Making SUVs a focal point of climate activism advances the argument that material inequality and unfettered individual freedoms are incompatible with any serious attempt to address climate change.

And here lies the crux of the conflict. The freedom of those who can afford to drive what, where and when they want infringes on the freedoms of the majority to safely use public space, enjoy clean air, and live on a sustainable planet.

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This blog is by Graeme Hayes, Reader in Political Sociology, Aston University and Cabot Institute for the Environment member Dr Oscar Berglund, Lecturer in International Public and Social Policy, University of Bristol

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Time for policymakers to make policies (and to learn from those who are)

From a social scientist’s point of view, the recent IPCC report and the reception it has received are a bit odd. The report certainly reflects a huge amount of work, its message is vital, and it’s great so many people are hearing it. But not much in the report updates how we think about climate change. We’ve known for a while that people are changing the climate, and that how much more the climate changes will depend on the decisions we make.

What decisions? The Summary for Policymakers— the scientists’ memo to the people who will make the really important choices—doesn’t say. The words “fossil fuel”, “oil”, and “coal” never even appear. Nor “regulation”, “ban”, “subsidy”, or “tax”. The last five pages of the 42-page Summary are entitled “Limiting Future Climate Change”; but while “policymakers” appear, “policies” do not.

This is not the fault of the authors; Working Group I’s remit does not include policy recommendations. Even Working Group III (focused on mitigation) is not allowed to advocate for specific choices. Yet every IPCC contributor knows the most important question is which emission pathway we take, and that will depend on what policies we choose.

Which is why it’s so odd that big policy issues and announcements get comparatively little airtime (and research funding). For example, in June, the European Union codified in law the goal of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions 55% by 2030 (relative to 1990), and last month the European Commission presented a set of ambitious proposals for hitting that target. As a continent, Europe is already leading the world in emission reductions (albeit starting from a high level, with large cumulative historical emissions), and showing the rest of the world how to organize high-income societies in low-carbon ways. But the Commission’s proposals—called “Fit for 55”—have gone largely under the radar, not only outside of the EU but even within it.

The proposals are worth examining. At least according to the Commission, they will make the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions consistent with its commitments under the Paris Agreement. (Independent assessments generally agree that while a 55% reduction by 2030 won’t hit the Paris Agreement’s 1.5˚ target, it would be a proportionate contribution to the goal of limiting global heating to no more than 2˚.) And they will build on the EU’s prior reduction of its territorial emissions by 24% between 1990 and 2019.

A change of -24% over that period, and -18% for consumption emissions, is in one sense disappointing, given that climate scientists were warning about the need for action even before 1990. But this achievement, inadequate though it may be, far exceeds those of other high per-capita emitters, like the U.S. (+14%), Canada (+21%), or Australia (+54%).

The most notable reductions have been in the areas of electricity generation and heavy industry—sectors covered by the EU’s emissions trading system (ETS). Emissions from buildings have not declined as much, and those from transportation (land, air, and marine) have risen. Several of the Fit for 55 proposals therefore focus on these sectors. Maritime transport is to be incorporated into the ETS; free permits for aviation are to be eliminated; and a new, separate ETS for fuels used in buildings and land transport is to be established. Sales of new cars and trucks with internal combustion engines will end as of 2035, and increased taxes will apply to fuels for transport, heat, and electricity.

The Commission also proposes to cut emissions under the ETS by 4.2% each year (rather than 2.2% currently); expand the share of electricity sourced from renewables; and set a stricter (lower) target for the total amount of energy the EU will use by 2030—for the sake of greater energy efficiency.

All of this is going to be hugely contentious, and it will take a year or two at least for the Commission, the member-states, and the European Parliament to negotiate a final version. Corporate lobbying will shape the outcome, as will public opinion (paywall).

Two of the most interesting proposals are meant to head off opposition from industry and voters. A carbon border adjustment mechanism will put a price on greenhouse gases emitted by the production abroad of selected imports into the EU (provisionally cement, fertiliser, iron, steel, electricity, and aluminium). This will protect European producers from competitors subject to weaker rules. A social climate fund, paid for out of the new ETS, will compensate low-income consumers and small businesses for the increased costs of fossil fuels—thereby preventing any rise in fuel poverty.

No country is doing enough to mitigate emissions. But Fit for 55 represents the broadest, most detailed emissions reductions plan in the world—and, in some form, it will be implemented. Decision-makers everywhere should be studying, and making, policies like this.

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This guest blog is by friend of Cabot Insitute for the Environment and PLOS Climate Academic Editor Malcolm Fairbrother. Malcolm is a Professor of Sociology at Umeå University (Sweden), the Institute for Futures Studies (Stockholm), and University of Graz (Austria). Twitter: @malcolmfair. This blog has been reposted with kind permission from Malcolm Fairbrother. View the original blog.

Top image credit: Cold Dawn, Warm World by Mark McNestry, CC BY 2.0

 

How scientists and policymakers collaborate towards sustainable Bristol

 

In the world facing increasingly complex and interdisciplinary challenges, our job descriptions expand to account for new collaborations, duties, and types of knowledge to engage with. Civil servants are now expected to ground their policies in evidence, while scientists are required to translate their findings so that they’re useful to the citizens, industry practitioners or politicians.

Climate action is no different. It comes to life at the curious intersection of activism, political will, market incentives, democratic mandate and, of course, scientific knowledge. As a university researcher, I am on a mission to ensure academic knowledge serves Bristol’s transition to the sustainable city.

An effective collaboration across the worlds of science and policy requires some professional unlearning. Convoluted and jargon-filled academic writing style is not going to cut it if we’re serious about influencing ‘the real world’ (sorry). Similarly, our traditional output formats are simply too long to be accessible for policymakers. I also firmly believe that we ought to advance public debates, rather than solely our respective disciplinary conversations; for that matter we need to invite a broader set of discussants to the table.

After 4 years of researching city-level climate policymaking, my head was filled with ideas and recommendations to the key local decisionmakers. Luckily, upon the completion of my PhD I have been offered a role on the Bristol’s Advisory Committee for Climate Change (BACCC). Over the past two years (well, nearly), we have been scrutinising the development of One City Climate Strategy and advising the local council on their policy development.

What does it involve in practice? – You might be asking. Our work so far has been mostly focusing on synthesising the academic evidence and communicating it in an effective way (with lots of help from a team in PolicyBristol, thank you!). Knowing ‘what works’ to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is one thing, conveying the message to convince politicians and citizens is no less a challenge!

Below, I’d like to tell you about three ways experts at BACCC collaborated with policymakers on local climate action:

  1. Submission of evidence to the national government inquiry: Covid impact on transport
  2. Analysis of policy gaps and opportunities: Energy White Paper
  3. Rapid review of evidence: Low Traffic Neighbourhoods

Submission of evidence to the national government inquiry

Over autumn 2020, Bristol City Council approached us for comments on the national inquiry exploring Covid-19 impacts on transport. At BACCC, we advised the council on the scope of the evidence submission, communication strategy and appropriate ways to present the data. We wanted to convey a message of a city that sees the covid-19 response as a leverage to ‘bounce forward’ to innovative and sustainable transport solutions rather than ‘bounce back’ to the old ways we deemed as normal:

“The council’s long-term ambition is to make the new road layouts permanent, creating cleaner air and better bus, walking and cycling journeys, alongside ongoing plans for a mass transit public transport system. The pandemic has had huge impacts on usual travel habits and, despite its challenges, air pollution levels dropped by almost half during the months of lockdown with big increases in walking and cycling. It would be prudent to capture those benefits and protect the long-term public health of the city”.

We are hoping that this submission, together with wealth of data on how people move will encourage the national government to devolve significant proportions of transport funding so that city leaders can turn covid emergency measures (e.g. bollards, signage, temporary closures) into high quality urban infrastructure.

Access the evidence here.

Analysis of policy gaps and opportunities

Policy landscape is dynamic; no single person has time to keep up with all the strategic documents, funding announcements and consultation opportunities. It is vital, therefore, that we are able to align the national policy direction with the local climate strategy. In early Spring 2021, we delivered a rapid assessment of gaps & opportunities, following our analysis of the National Government “Energy White Paper” and “10 Point plan”. While there are clear overlaps (e.g. in the funding for electric vehicles, retrofits, heat pumps installation), certain local ambitions cannot be clearly mapped to the national agenda. As such, we risk that Bristol’s plans in the realms of zero-carbon freight consolidation, solar generation or business carbon emissions will not come to fruition.

Read the full paper here.

Rapid review of evidence

Energised by the fierce (yet polarising) debate on Low Traffic Neighbourhoods, we set ourselves to review the literature on the impacts, risks and opportunities on this controversial topic. We reviewed academic literature (from statistical public health analysis to qualitative human geography), news items and policy reports to provide a balanced feedback to the local planners. In particular, we wanted to disentangle empty rhetoric from genuine concerns to cool down the temperature of the conversation.

We provided six key recommendations:

  1. Reassure that the co-design process is taking place to deliver Low Traffic Neighbourhoods.
  2. Show compelling evidence on: the benefits to health, safety and lower traffic speed.
  3. Clarify misconceptions about: potential traffic displacement, lack of accessibility for emergency services, lack of access for deliveries and blue badge holders, loss in customer footfall.
  4. Acknowledge complexities to do with the potential for short-term disruptions and the risk of gentrification
  5. Challenge sensationalist media reporting by dispelling unverified claims, exposing exaggerated claims and monitoring the evolving conversation.
  6. Above all, set out the narrative:
    • We need to make positive changes: we cannot continue as now for the health and wellbeing of our communities and beyond.
    • Some disruption is inevitable, and we will try to mitigate this and work with those affected, though the benefits are real and important.
    • What will be delivered will improve the environment for local people – and help to address national and international ambitions.

Access the full review and detailed recommendations.

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This blog is written by Cabot Institute for the Environment member Dr Ola Michalec, a social scientist based at the University of Bristol, researching regulation in the domain of digital innovations for sustainable energy. Ola also serves as a member of the Bristol Advisory Committee for Climate Change.

Dr Ola Michalec