Is the Loss and Damage Fund all that it promises to be?

Examining some of the Fund’s shortcomings and putting things into perspective after COP 28

Failed crop

 COP 28, the latest United Nations Climate Conference, came to an end in December 2023. It began with an agreement to launch the loss and damage fund, which was kick-started by the UAE’s $100 million pledge. A further 15 countries followed suit, making pledges of varying amounts, and by 2 December 2023, a cumulative total of $655.9 million had been pledged to the loss and damage fund.[1] The fund has been heralded by many as the biggest success of the entire conference and a historic agreement – being the first time that a substantive decision was adopted on the first day of the Conference. The delegates of nations present from around the world, rose in a standing ovation when the agreement was passed.  

However, although the loss and damage fund is an important and long overdue step towards getting vulnerable countries and communities funding they require, it may be too soon to be rejoicing, with many of the details regarding the fund’s set-up being highly controversial.  

A brief background to the loss and damage fund  

The loss and damage fund was first agreed to at COP 27 last year, after more than three decades of pressure from developing countries disproportionately affected by the irreversible and adverse consequences of climate change calling for funding to help them pay for the losses and damages suffered as a result of the escalating climate crisis. These impacts range from, and are caused by, increasingly frequent and more extreme weather events, as well as slow-onset events, including sea-level rise, increasing temperatures, ocean acidification, glacial retreats, loss of biodiversity, land and forest degradation, salinisation and desertification. These endanger human security and health, destroy homes, disrupt agriculture and threaten water and food security in ways that are often unequally distributed. 

As one of the outcomes of COP 27, a Transitional Committee was established and, in the lead up to COP 28, they met several times to negotiate the operationalisation and the details of the new funding arrangements. In less than a year, the Transitional Committee were able to report back with its recommendations and its text was subsequently passed at COP 28, with no objection by the parties. After almost no momentum for thirty years, the progress made in less than a year is a remarkable feat.  

Examining some of the shortcomings  

While funding for climate disaster loss and damages is vital and certainly hard fought for, one should be hesitant before deeming it a substantive win for developing countries.  

 Inadequate and duplicate pledges 

Although $655.9 million may at first glance appear like a significant amount of money, it is in fact relatively insubstantial when one considers that it is estimated that more than $400 billion is suffered in losses by developing countries each year,[2] a figure which is expected to grow as the impacts of climate change grow worse. The current funding will therefore cover less than 0.2% of developing countries’ annual needs. It has therefore been recommended that $400 billion be used as a baseline and revised upwards over time to meet increasing needs.[3] Furthermore, how to actually implement the pledges that have been made poses its own issue. This is a problem that previous funds, such as the Green Climate Fund, have faced and it is an issue that will need to be tackled to ensure that the pledges made do not simply turn out to be more broken promises.  Moreover, approximately $115.3 million of the total amount pledged to date will go towards setting up the fund rather than directly to beneficiaries of the fund.[4] Future pledges to the fund may make this operational expense insignificant, but it is still uncertain how much money will go into the fund and where it will come from. In addition, campaigners pointed out that some countries, such as the United Kingdom, were simply re-pledging money that they had already committed to, rather than offering new or additional funding.[5] In this way, the United Kingdom are simply re-branding existing forms of climate finance or development aid so as to appear to be contributing.  

Moreover, the amount pledged by some countries has been criticised for being inadequate. In particular, the United States, the world’s largest historical emitter[6] and the largest producer and consumer of oil and gas in 2023,[7] pledged only $17.5 million, an amount that still needs to be approved by Congress and accordingly hinges on the political climate and the upcoming elections. When viewed against the billions of dollars of undelivered climate finance that the United States owes to developed countries as part of its share of the annual $100 billion climate finance goal committed to by developed countries in 2009, this amount of $17.5 million certainly appears limited.[8] Of the $43.51 billion the United States owes, as part of its fair share of the $100 billion goal, only $9.27 billion has been provided to date, being a measly 21% of its targets.[9] 

It is also very telling as to what the United States’ priorities are when the $17.5 million pledged by the United States to the loss and damage fund is compared to the estimated annual $20.5 billion in fossil fuel subsidies distributed by the United States government each year,[10] contributing to the cumulative amount of $7 trillion in fossil fuel subsidies in 2022.[11] 

Historical responsibility and voluntary contributions  

During the negotiations that the Transitional Committee had leading up to COP 28, the United States, Australia and Canada all insisted that the loss and damage fund be de-linked from liability or compensation. This is in keeping with previous stance adopted by developed countries, particularly with that of the United States, who insisted that this wording be included in the decision on the adoption of the Paris Agreement which noted that loss and damage was “not a basis for liability or compensation”.[12] As the historically greatest emitters, developed countries have long opposed the establishment of the loss and damage fund over concerns that it would open the door to legal liability and compensation. Due to this refusal to assume historical accountability, communities who are experiencing the worst impacts of climate change have been forced to shoulder the consequent costs of loss and damage suffered, even though many of them, such as the Pacific Small Island Developing States, have contributed very little to climate change. This goes to the issue of equity and responsibility for the climate crisis, a sensitive topic which makes developed countries defensive. Instead of framing loss and damage in terms of responsibility and liability, wording was included in the agreed text stating that the fund is based on cooperation and facilitation.  

The approved text also stops short of demanding any payments, with the United States having fought to ensure that the contributions should remain voluntary, and the text indicated that developed countries ought to “take the lead” on providing seed money. The text “urged” developed countries to contribute to the fund, while other developing countries are “encouraged” to provide support “on a voluntary basis”.[13] The United States, Australia and Canada further insisted that contributor countries include presently high-polluting nations such as China, India, Russia and Saudia Arabia, and that only the least developed countries be eligible to benefit from the fund. As a result, high polluter states are not obligated to make any payments into the fund and instead of framing the contributions in terms of countries’ responsibility for the majority of greenhouse gas emissions, they are framed as donations made out of generosity and charity. 

The World Bank as the interim host of the Loss and Damage Fund, the set-up of the Fund’s governing board and the structure of funding 

Who would host and administer the new fund was a politically contentious sticking point in the discussions leading up to COP 28. Less than a month before COP 28, at a final and impromptu meeting called by the Transitional Committee, this matter was hastily decided. Developing countries wanted the loss and damage fund to operate as an independent United Nations body and were resistant to it being hosted by the World Bank, which many poorer countries see as an economic policy weapon wielded by the industrialised world.  

The World Bank was established by colonial powers and is known for having historically spread pro-Western ideologies and policies.[14] Moreover, it is housed in Washington DC, is headed by a US citizen, appointed by the government of the United States, as its major shareholder,[15] and has a history of operating as an Untied States policy tool. In addition, concerns were raised that the World Bank would be charging high hosting fees, has a weak climate change record and that having it host and administer the loss and damage fund would compromise the fund’s independence and give developed countries the influence over who receives the funds and who doesn’t. Developing countries eventually caved under the United States’ insistence that the fund be hosted and administered by the World Bank, and it was agreed that the World Bank would act as an interim host, provided that the World Bank would agree to certain conditions. This arrangement is to be reassessed in four years, which will result in either the fund being made fully independent or continuing as a permanent hosting situation under the World Bank.  

The United States has argued that there are practical reasons for placing the loss and damage fund under the auspices of the World Bank, and that the fiduciary experience the institution has, places it in the best position to deliver money to state beneficiaries. However, given the World Bank’s donor-recipient and loan-driven business model, reservations have been expressed as to whether developed donor countries would have a disproportionate influence, even though the Transitional Committee has recommended that the fund’s governing board have a majority of developing-country members. Although this sounds positive, the board’s composition is limited to national representatives, meaning that civil society representatives such as members of Indigenous groups, are automatically excluded. 

Another concern regarding the World Bank, is high overhead costs, with the administrative fees of the World Bank rising and likely to absorb a large portion of the funding meant for the fund’s beneficiaries. Further, developing countries have consistently called for funding to be in the form of grants, rather than debt and loan financing, which would only deepen the debt crisis and increase developing countries’ burden, which is the traditional model of financing employed by the World Bank. The agreed text stipulates that “the Fund will provide financing in the form of grants and highly concessional loans”.[16]

The ultimate success or failure of the loss and damage fund still hangs in the balance  

In order to retain any faith in the international climate policy process, there needs to be follow-through on both the pledges and commitments made. To date, climate finance has not had the best track record. Other funds, including the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund, have been radically under-resourced from the get-go and climate finance has grown at an annual rate of only 7%, which is less than half of the cumulative annual growth of 21% which is required until 2030.[17] In order for the Loss and Damage Fund to be effective, the scale of the funding will need to be increased, as what has been pledged to date constitutes a mere 0.2% of what is actually needed. 

There are also still a lot of questions to address, which the new Board of the Loss and Damage Fund will start to work through at its first meeting on 31 January 2024. Popular Gentle, the development management expert to the prime minister of Nepal, pointed out that while the establishment of the loss and damage fund is a promising start, that applause should be reserved for the time being, saying “our concern is we are excited about the establishment of the loss and damage fund. We are still cautious that the same story will be repeated. We need easy, equitable, accessible loss and damage funds without any procedural difficulties”.[18]  

So far, there are already some concerning issues that have arisen out of what has been decided. The issues that still need to be determined will prove critical to whether the fund’s operation is a success or a failure. These issues include the fact that there are no specifics yet on the scale and scope of funding, the financial targets or how the loss and damage fund will be funded going forward – although the text provides that contributions will come from a “variety of sources”.[19] The current language included in the agreed text merely invites developed nations to “take the lead”[20] in providing finance and encourages other developing country parties to make commitments. There is also little clarity regarding the performance indicators and who will be eligible to receive funding or precisely what type of climate loss and damages will qualify. Another issue will be how the application procedure will work and how quickly countries who need it will be able to access the funds and whether they will encounter any procedural difficulties in doing so. Until these things are decided, it is simply too early to greet the loss and damage fund with anything other than a mixture of cautious optimism and healthy scepticism. 

References  

[1] Joe Thwaites ‘COP28 Climate Funds Pledge Tracker’ (NRDC, 9 December 2023), available at: https://www.nrdc.org/bio/joe-thwaites/cop-28-climate-fund-pledge-tracker

[2] Julie-Anne Richards, Rajib Ghosal, Brenda Mwale, Hyacinthe Niyitegeka and Moleen Nand ‘STANDING IN SOLIDARITY WITH THOSE ON THE FRONTLINES OF THE CLIMATE CRISIS: A LOSS AND DAMAGE PACKAGE FOR COP 28’(The Loss and Damage Collaboration, 20 November 2023), available at: https://assets-global.website-files.com/605869242b205050a0579e87/655b50e163c953059360564d_L%26DC_L%26D_Package_for_COP28_20112023_1227.pdf

[3] Julie-Anne Richards, Liane Schalatek, Leia Achampong, and Heidi White ‘THE LOSS AND DAMAGE FINANCE LANDSCAPE’ (The Loss and Damage Collaboration, 16 May 2023), available at: https://www.lossanddamagecollaboration.org/publication/the-loss-and-damage-finance-landscape

[4] ‘COP 28: Key outcomes agreed to at the UN Climate talks in Dubai’ (Carbon Brief, 13 December 2023), available at: https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop28-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-dubai/

[5] Tweet on X (CAN-UK 30 November 2023), available https://twitter.com/CAN_UK_/status/1730225613456204089?s=20

[6] ‘Cumulative carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions from fossil fuel combustion worldwide from 1750 to 2022, by major country’ (Statistica, 12 December 2023), available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1007454/cumulative-co2-emissions-worldwide-by-country/#:~:text=Global%20cumulative%20CO%E2%82%82%20emissions%20from,combustion%201750%2D2022%2C%20by%20country&text=The%20United%20States%20was%20the,birth%20of%20the%20industrial%20revolution

[7] World Population Review, available at: https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/oil-producing-countries; https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/oil-consumption-by-country; https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/natural-gas-by-country

[8] At the 15th Conference of Parties (COP15) of the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries committed to a collective goal of mobilising USD 100 billion per year by 2020 for climate action in developing countries, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. The goal was formalised at COP16 in Cancun, and at COP21 in Paris, it was reiterated and extended to 2025; Laetitia Pettinotti, Yue Cao, Tony Mwenda Kamninga, Sarah Colenbrander ‘A fair share of climate finance? The Adaptation Edition’ (ODI, 13 September 2023), available at: https://odi.org/en/publications/a-fair-share-of-climate-finance-the-adaptation-edition/#:~:text=In%20a%20bid%20to%20strengthen,national%20income%2C%20and%20population%20size

[9] At the 15th Conference of Parties (COP15) of the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries committed to a collective goal of mobilising USD 100 billion per year by 2020 for climate action in developing countries, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. The goal was formalised at COP16 in Cancun, and at COP21 in Paris, it was reiterated and extended to 2025; Laetitia Pettinotti, Yue Cao, Tony Mwenda Kamninga, Sarah Colenbrander ‘A fair share of climate finance? The Adaptation Edition’ (ODI, 13 September 2023), available at: https://odi.org/en/publications/a-fair-share-of-climate-finance-the-adaptation-edition/#:~:text=In%20a%20bid%20to%20strengthen,national%20income%2C%20and%20population%20size

[10] Janet Redman ‘DIRTY ENERGY DOMINANCE: DEPENDENT ON DENIAL – HOW THE U.S. FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY DEPENDS ON SUBSIDIES AND CLIMATE DENIAL’ (Oil Change International, October 2017), available at: https://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2017/10/OCI_US-Fossil-Fuel-Subs-2015-16_Final_Oct2017.pdf

[11] Simon Black, Ian Parry, Nate Vernon ‘Fossil Fuel Subsidies Surged to Record $7 Trillion’ (IMF Blog, 24 August 2023), available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/08/24/fossil-fuel-subsidies-surged-to-record-7-trillion

[12] UNFCCC 2015, Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add, para. 51, available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf

[13] Para 12 of Annex I ‘Draft decision on the operationalization of the new funding arrangements, including the fund, for responding to loss and damage referred to in paragraphs 2–3 of decisions 2/CP.27 and 2/CMA.4’ to the Report by the Transitional Committee dated 28 November 2023, FCCC/CP/2023/9−FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/9, available at: https://unfccc.int/documents?f%5B0%5D=topic%3A1136&search2=&search3=&page=0%2C0%2C0

[14] E Feder, ‘Plundering the Poor: The Role of the World Bank in the Third World’ (1983) 13 International Journal of Health Services 649, available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.2190/6GE4-8EC6-JXD5-QJ2Q

[15] The Congressional Research Service Report prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, titled ‘Selecting the World Bank President’ and updated 10 May 2023, available at: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R42463.pdf

[16] Para 57 of Annex II to the Report by the Transitional Committee dated 28 November 2023, FCCC/CP/2023/9−FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/9, available at: https://unfccc.int/documents?f%5B0%5D=topic%3A1136&search2=&search3=&page=0%2C0%2C0

[17] Baysa Naran, Jake Connolly, Paul Rosane, Dharshan Wignarajah, Githungo Wakaba and Barbara Buchner ‘The Global Landscape on Climate Finance: A Decade of Data’ (Climate Policy Initiative, 27 October 2022), available at: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-a-decade-of-data/

[18] Lameez Omarjee ‘COP 28 I Pledges for Loss and Damage roll in, but billions is needed – SA chief negotiator’ (news24, 10 December 2023), available at: https://www.news24.com/fin24/climate_future/news/cop28-pledges-for-loss-and-damage-roll-in-but-billions-needed-sa-chief-negotiator-20231210

[19] Para 20 (i) of Annex I ‘Draft decision on the operationalization of the new funding arrangements, including the fund, for responding to loss and damage referred to in paragraphs 2–3 of decisions 2/CP.27 and 2/CMA.4’ to the Report by the Transitional Committee dated 28 November 2023, FCCC/CP/2023/9−FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/9, available at: https://unfccc.int/documents?f%5B0%5D=topic%3A1136&search2=&search3=&page=0%2C0%2C0

[20] Para 13 of Annex I ‘Draft decision on the operationalization of the new funding arrangements, including the fund, for responding to loss and damage referred to in paragraphs 2–3 of decisions 2/CP.27 and 2/CMA.4’ to the Report by the Transitional Committee dated 28 November 2023, FCCC/CP/2023/9−FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/9, available at: https://unfccc.int/documents?f%5B0%5D=topic%3A1136&search2=&search3=&page=0%2C0%2C0

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This blog is written by Cabot Institute for the Environment member Alexia Kaplan.

Alexia Kaplan
Alexia Kaplan

COP27: Egyptian student perspectives and insight

One of the privileges of being a student at the University of Bristol (UoB) is belonging to a diverse academic community comprised of students from many cultural, social and religious backgrounds. With the hosting of COP27 in Egypt this year, the Sustainability Network sought the opportunity to gain insight and perspectives first-hand from Egyptian UoB students around the significance and implications of the climate change focused conference being hosted in their country. Below is a recount of the respondents’ views and opinions.

Disclaimer: Views do not represent the University of Bristol nor the Sustainability Network. Names have been removed to protect the anonymity and privacy of the students who chose to speak. 

The significance of climate change

Climate change is one of the most important issues the world is currently facing and will have wide ranging impacts that will influence our daily lives. Climate change, however, is often viewed as a future concern to be dealt with later – despite consequences and impacts thereof already being felt globally and locally making it a current and time sensitive issue. Climate change is also a complex, intersectional issue which coincides with issues of race, class, gender and inequality to name a few. The importance of speaking about climate change, even as non-experts, was highlighted by respondent A. Ultimately, as shared by respondent C, when thinking about climate change, we need to remember that the Earth is our only home (for now) and should be treated with care as we are borrowing it from future generations.

Climate change and Egypt

All respondents shared that either they themselves, or their families, have directly been affected by the impacts of climate change in Egypt. Respondent C shared that when speaking to parents and grandparents about the historical climate of Egypt, many changes to patterns and averages can be observed. This is in line with the scientific evidence that extreme weather events are getting more frequent, severe and widespread. Recurrent examples of climate change risks for Egypt mentioned by respondents and aligning to scientific consensus include:

Heat – Extreme temperatures driven by global warming impact the physical heat tolerance of individuals as well as affects infrastructure and agriculture negatively. Unlike other regional players who have the financial capacity for adaptation measures such as ubiquitous air conditioning, Egypt has less financial and infrastructural resilience to this concern.

Water scarcity – Water supply is a major a concern given climate change driven changing rainfall patterns in what is already an arid country. This issue was linked to regional geopolitical issues such as the contentious building of dams in nearby countries that alter regional water availability patterns.

Food security – The climate change risk to agriculture as a livelihood as well as for food availability was highlighted. The transboundary nature of climate change was reiterated as negative impacts to agriculture could affect food exports such as citrus and grains, thereby impacting global food supply chains. Should agriculture be detrimentally impacted, the cost of food associated with increasing food import dependency for Egypt would also impact local Egyptian food security as food would become less affordable.

Flooding – The threat of sea level rise as well as storm related flooding is of major concern, with many locations having limited financial and infrastructural adaptation capacity, thus posing a risk to infrastructure and human lives. The concerns of climate change refugees and regional migration motivated by climatic and economic variables were brought out in these discussions, once again demonstrating the global scope of climate change concerns.

Air pollution – Air quality, particularly in densely populated areas, is a major concern. Respondents attributed this to overpopulation, major car usage prevalence and general city congestion. Air pollution has health concerns as well as impacts natural weather patterns.

Despite first hand experiences and the extreme risks faced by many communities – particularly coastal communities such as Alexandria and densely populated regions such as Cairo – many respondents noted that climate change has not been a major focus for the Egyptian government over the past few years. This was perceived to be a result of conflicting urgent priorities such as unemployment, healthcare, poverty and education, as well as limited financial capacity and/or political will to address climate change simultaneously to these issues. It was pointed out that there are often financial incentives behind government investment decisions, with money often only being invested into projects that would see immediate returns. Others pointed out, however, that there has been significant progress made over recent years including reductions in plastic consumption, better waste management, investment into sustainable energy sources and biodiversity protection programs. Concerns around political stability and corruption hampering climate change action were noted – in line with the concerns of many LEDCs (Less Economically Developed Countries). The links between climate change and social disparities were demonstrated as the poorest and most vulnerable people would likely be impacted by climate change first.

The COP27 Conference

Respondents shared mixed feelings about the hosting of COP27 in Egypt. On one hand, this event does represent a significant geopolitical win and the bringing of Egypt and the MENA region to the global stage. This was a source of great pride to respondents, as representation of non-western countries in these typically Eurocentric global discussions was viewed to matter greatly. Moreover, the potential benefits to tourism and shaping of perceptions of Egypt as an innovative, up-and-coming and metropolitan country were seen to be positive. On the other hand, some respondents shared concerns about the efficacy of previous COP conferences and noted that the event tends to be overhyped and lead to very little meaningful impact – with goals of previous conferences such as a 1.5⁰C warning reduction targets not on track to being met. The risk of the conference becoming a blame-game or having little effect on the behaviour of large corporations that hold significant power were also mentioned. This COP conference is therefore viewed a make-or break opportunity in the climate change battle. Hopes for the setting of ambitious standards and legal precedents were shared. All respondents concluded by hoping this conference would be different and better than previous conferences, leading to tangible change and positive outcomes. (see the Sustainability Network Post-COP debrief for a reflection on the conference).

Looking forward

So where to from here? Whilst climate change is a global issue that will affect different places in different ways, respondents noted that everyone has a role to play in reaching towards a common goal. Respondent A reflected on the importance of critical thinking and communication, reminding us that disagreement is a common phenomenon that can be leveraged to understand the opinions and perspectives of others. All respondents reflected on the importance of education and awareness surrounding climate change. There were concerns surrounding the influence that COVID-19, the Russia-Ukraine conflict and other socioeconomic or geopolitical current affairs may have on the success of climate change action.

Generally, respondents reiterated the importance of incremental change and encouraged action and implementation over policies and legislation. The importance of international collaboration was revealed, as movements are stronger when we all work together and leverage the unique strengths of individuals and countries alike. Respondent C encouraged us to hold governments accountable, because as they pointed out, if we don’t, who will? The success of the COP27 conference will likely only be seen retroactively over longer time scales, so whilst one respondent urged dramatic outcomes and action to come from the discussions, another respondent viewed success as even one person acting better.

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The Sustainability Network thanks the respondents for their time, honesty and patriotism. The kindness, care and passion of the Egyptian people was well demonstrated and we definitely want to visit the incredible beauty and culture of Egypt you shared with us.

 

 

After COP27, is 1.5C still alive?

Try booking a train on Boxing Day in the UK and you’ll soon find out that none are running. Well, not entirely. One small railway line managed by indomitable Gauls still holds out: The Eurostar. And airports are still being served as plains are still flying. Obvs. If this is not just the present, but also our future, then Mia Mottley, Prime Minister of Barbados, is right: “We’re at 1.2 degrees now. If in 5 years we’re at 1.5, then we’re…. we’re…. I won’t use that word now.”

Apologies, I got carried away. Back to planes (flying), trains (not running) and automobiles (driving). These are symptomatic of the mess we’re in, but nothing compared to the mess we’re heading towards. And nothing compared to the mess others already find themselves in. If these current trends continues the number of refugees is set to increase from 21m in 2022 to 1bn in 2050 (Mia Mottley again). Many originate from Africa which is responsible for only 4% of global emissions (and 2% of historic emissions) and home to 600m without access to electricity.

While inanimate capital moves freely across borders, refugees are increasingly prevented from doing so. As their poverty and desperation grows in a warming world, their cost of borrowing increases as the World Bank uses per capita income as a proxy for borrowing conditions. Consequently, such countries (Least Developed Countries – LDCs) borrow at 12-14% while rich countries (the G7) borrow at 1-4%. According to Indian economist Joyashree Roy, these countries need 7% growth per year to escape their plight but if they are borrowing at +10% cost of capital, this growth will not be powered by renewables.

Neither will the focusing on the supply of renewables alone deliver Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Demand-side interventions are necessary to shift investment patterns and create new economic opportunities that are synergistic with SDGs. But all this depends on infrastructure access and empowerment to make the right choices, which in turn are determined by the flow of finance. To put on track for 1.5C, these flows need to quadruple to $4-6trn per year, according to Macky Sall, Senegalese President and current Chairperson of the African Union. IPCC Chair Hoesung Lee, goes one step further: access to capital is the key determinant of limiting global warming to 1.5C. Concessional access to finance was provided during COVID, as Mia Mottley pointed out, so why can it not be provided to prevent climate catastrophe?

Dr Colin Nolden (left) at COP27 with IPCC Chair Hoesung Lee and Dr Alix Dietzel

On the plus side, outgoing COP26 President Alok Sharma suggests that 90% of global emissions are covered by a net zero target. Almost 1/3rd of the global population who accumulate 55% of global GDP are covered by Emissions Trading Schemes, according to Stefano de Clara, Head of the International Carbon Action Partnership. Then again, the current average carbon price stands at $6/t. This needs to increase to $75/t by 2030 to limit warming to 2C, not to mention 1.5C, according to Dora Benedek from the International Monetary Fund.

Without such a massive increase in the cost of carbon, emissions are expected to be only 12% (6GtCO2eq) lower in 2030 compared to today. What about magic??, you might interject at this point. Current Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and Direct Air Capture (DAC) capacities amount to around 4 hours of global emissions and are projected to amount to around 16 hours in 2030, according to Sven Teske from the University of Technology Sydney. To keep 1.5C alive, we need to reduce emissions by 30-50% in by 2030 (Dora Benedek again). So yes to magic, but only within the bounds of Kate Raworth’s famous doughnut.

And it’s both sides of that tasty doughnut that we need to bear in mind. On the outside, quick wins are possible regarding methane emissions which are responsible for around 0.5C of the 1.2C we stand above pre-industrial levels. Around 0.1C of warming can be addressed by cutting gas flaring and coal related methane emissions at no cost, according to US Deputy Climate Envoy Richard Duke. Addressing such emissions deliver invaluable co-benefits on the inside. 15% of all deaths (7million a year) are due to polluted air, according to Jane Burston of the Clean Air Fund. Companies are having to pay a pollution premium to attract talent to polluted cities.

It’s both the out and the in-side of the doughnut we need to focus on for a just transition to happen. According to Heike Henn, of Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action and whatnot, Article 6 is emerging as the mechanism to allocate those $100bn/a finance pledged in Paris which never materialised as well as the trillions needed to implement NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions) and SDGs.

Not Article 6.2 though, which requires adjustments in GHG registries upon the transfer of a carbon credits (Internationally Transferrable Mitigation Outcome – ITMO) and is already seeing emerging economies lowering ambition in their NDCs. Article 6.4 is what I’m talking about. Although it will take years to be operationalised, its infrastructure is being developed as we speak. The Climate Action Data Trust, for example, can significantly lower transaction costs of carbon market transactions through automated Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) and tokenisation to create digital carbon assets.

Now it’s down to ambitious countries to form alliances and agree on a sharing mechanism to convert the 1.5C target into demand for mitigation action distributed dynamically over time, and measure achievement and contribution using Article 6.4. “Getting to net zero is a heroic task”, according to Dirk Forrister of the International Emissions Trading Association, “and you won’t get there by going alone”.

Where does this leave 1.5C? “I find it hard to stay optimistic”, said Nichola Sturgeon on day 1 of COP27. I echo this sentiment. Yet we need to remind ourselves that the combined net zero targets, if implemented, can limit warming to 1.7C and increase, yes INCREASE, global GDP by 0.4% per year, according to Fatih Birol from the IEA. If we can’t sort this out, bins will be burning.

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This blog was written by Cabot Institute for the Environment member Dr Colin Nolden, Bristol Law School, University of Bristol.

Colin Nolden

 

 

COP27: What really happened on finance, justice and Loss and Damage?

The Cabot Institute for the Environment sent three delegates to the recent Conference of the Parties 27 (COP27). Drs Alix Dietzel (Sociology, Politics and International Studies); Colin Nolden (Bristol Law School); and Rachel James (Geographical Sciences) were present for most of the first week and Colin was there for the full two weeks. As the Institute has observer status with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Alix, Rachel and Colin had the chance to engage with policy makers and climate policy experts from around the world to help promote climate action which is informed by the best evidence and research.

We asked them to give an update on their experience at COP27 and as a result, whether the pledges made at COP27 would mean that 1.5C is still achievable.

Drs Colin Nolden and Alix Dietzel at COP27.

Climate finance – Dr Colin Nolden

Colin’s research interests span sustainable energy policy, regulation and business models and interactions with secondary markets such as carbon markets and other sectors such as mobility. COP27 was an opportunity for him to talk directly to policymakers about implementing the Paris Agreement and to people directly affected by climate policy decisions.

Here are Colin’s post-COP thoughts:

“Alongside Loss and Damage, the main issue discussed at COP is climate finance for decarbonisation. The $100bn/yr pledged in Paris has never materialised and to add injury to insult, rich countries can borrow at 4%, whereas poor countries borrow at 14%, as Mia Motley, Prime Minister of Barbados, pointed out in her speech on Day 1. Under these conditions, investments in fossil fuel infrastructures pay off, but investments in renewables do not. An endless number of panel discussions and side events on ‘climate finance’ and ‘accelerating the clean energy/net zero transition’ are testament to this gap.

“Article 6 of the Paris Agreement is a mechanism to overcome this funding gap by providing the legal foundation to finance decarbonisation projects in a country in exchange for carbon credits provided by another. Whether these should lead to according adjustments in emissions inventories, as is the case under bilateral agreements using Article 6.2, is controversial. How Article 6.4 will deal with this issue is still unclear and is unlikely to be agreed on at successive COPs. Negotiations on Article 6 will determine the climate credit and finance architecture for years to come.”

Climate justice – Dr Alix Dietzel

Alix is Associate Director for Impact and Innovation at the Cabot Institute for the Environment and an environmental justice scholar. Her role at COP27 was to observe the negotiations and critically reflect on whose voices were heard and whose were left out of the discussion, as well as concentrating on whether topics such as Loss and Damage and just transition were being given adequate space and time during the negotiations.

Dr Alix Dietzel at COP27.

Here are Alix’s reflections from COP27:

“Despite much excitement over a new Loss and Damage fund, there is backsliding on commitments to lower emissions and phasing out fossil fuels. As an academic expert in just transition who went along this year hoping to make a difference, I share the anger felt around the world about this outcome.

“Attendance at COPs is strictly regulated. Parties (negotiating teams), the media, and observers (NGOs, IGOs, and UN Agencies) must all be pre-approved. Observers have access to the main plenaries and ceremonies, the pavilion exhibition spaces, and side-events. The negotiation rooms, however, are largely off limits. Most of the day is spent listening to speeches, networking, and asking questions at side-events. The main role of observers, then, is to apply indirect pressure on negotiators, report on what is happening, and network. Meaningful impact on and participation in negotiations seemed out of reach for many of the passionate people I met.

“It has long been known that who gets a say in climate change governance is skewed. As someone working on fair decision making as part of just transition, it is clear that only the most powerful voices are reflected in treaties such as the Paris Agreement. Despite being advertised as ‘Africa’s COP’, COP27 has further hampered inclusion. The run up was dogged by accusations of inflated hotel prices and concerns over surveillance, no chance to organize protests, and warnings about Egypt’s brutal police state.

“Arriving in Sharm El Sheik, there was an air of intimidation starting at the airport, where military personnel scrutinized passports. Police roadblocks featured heavily on our way to the hotel, and military officials surrounded the COP venue the next morning. Inside the venue, there were rumours we were being watched and observers were urged not to download the official app. More minor issues included voices literally not being heard due to unreliable microphones and the constant drone of airplanes overhead. Food queues were huge, and it was difficult to access water to refill our bottles. Sponsored by Coca Cola, we could buy soft drinks. Outside of COP, unless I was accompanied by a man, I faced near constant sexual harassment, hampering my ability to come and go freely.

“Who was there and who was most represented at COP27 also concerned me. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) registered the largest party delegation with more than 1,000 people, almost twice the size of the next biggest delegation, Brazil. Oil and gas lobby representatives were registered in the national delegations of 29 different countries and were larger than any single national delegation (outside of the UAE). At least 636 of those attending were lobbyists for the fossil-fuel industry. Despite the promise that COP27 would foreground African interests, the fossil lobby outnumbers any delegation from Africa. These numbers give a sense of who has power and say at these negotiations, and who does not.

“All this to say, I am not surprised at the outcomes. There is some good news in the form of a new fund for Loss and Damage – but there is no agreement yet on how much money should be paid in, by whom, and on what basis. More worryingly, the outcome document makes no mention of phasing out fossil fuels, and scant reference to the 1.5C target. Laurence Tubiana, one of the architects of the Paris Agreement, blamed the host country, Egypt, for the final decision.

“COP27 produced a text that clearly protects oil and gas petro-states and the fossil fuel industry. The final outcomes demonstrate that despite the thousands who were there to advocate for climate justice, it was the fossil fuel lobby who had most influence. As a climate justice scholar, I am deeply worried about the processes at COPs, especially given next year’s destination: The United Arab Emirates. Time is running out and watered-down commitments on emissions are at this stage deeply unjust and frankly dangerous.”

Loss and Damage – Dr Rachel James

Rachel is a climate scientist, focusing on African climate systems and developing climate science to inform and advance climate change policy. Her previous research has been designed to progress international climate policy discussions, including the COP process, and she has analysed the impacts of global mitigation goals, comparing different warming scenarios (1.5°C, 2°C and beyond).  At COP27, she engaged in adaptation discussions, to learn more about how science can support national adaptation planning, to guide her new research programme “Salient”, a UKRI Future Leaders Fellowship to improve climate information for adaptation, primarily in southern Africa.

Dr Rachel James (fourth from right) at COP27.

In her previous work, Dr James has also looked at how science can support policy discussions about  ‘Loss and Damage’, from climate change, and at COP27 she followed discussions on Loss and Damage, as well as taking part in a workshop to establish a network of African researchers focusing on Loss and Damage. Rachel reflects on her experience of COP and the Loss and Damage discussions:

“The COP is now a huge event, with hundreds of discussions happening simultaneously, and many thousands of people, (almost) all pushing for climate action, and acting on it in their own ways. There are lots of things going on, deals being struck, collaborations forming, alongside the official UNFCCC business.

“This was supposed to be the “COP of implementation”, as the Paris Agreement and the rulebook are already in place. Some said we were largely beyond negotiation.

“However, the Global South came ready to negotiate, particularly on Loss and Damage. They wanted a finance facility on Loss and Damage to be established. Negotiations began in the weekend before the COP, and – after negotiating all night with no food – the developing countries succeeded in getting this onto the formal agenda.

“Over the two weeks of the COP, my perception was that there was a huge shift on Loss and Damage. Once it was on the official agenda, it was much easier to talk about. It has been a very contentious issue. Broadly, the most vulnerable countries have called for mechanisms to address the fact that they are, and will continue to, experience loss and damage from climate change impacts like sea level rise and extreme weather. Those countries who have emitted the most fear this could lead to unlimited liability. When I first started working on it I’d often get a worried look when I mentioned the topic.

“In a side event during the first week at Sharm El Sheikh, I heard someone say “some magic has happened” and we can now talk about this in the mainstream. We also saw a series of announcements from countries committing finance for Loss and Damage.  Then, finally, after two weeks of negotiations ran into extra time, countries agreed to establish a fund for Loss and Damage.

“This was a huge victory for the developing countries. Lots of questions remain about how it will work, who will pay into it, and who will benefit, but nevertheless it marks a big step. Developing countries (especially AOSIS, the Alliance of Small Island States) have been working on this for decades. The negotiators work so hard, often into the night, it’s incredible.

“My overall view is that COP continues to be a difficult process, but it is shifting, maybe substantially. Many view COP as a talk shop and suggest it’s a waste of time, but I disagree. Although the process is tortuous, slow, and frustrating, it is the best one we have, and still vital. Progress is way too slow but there is progress. Every country is represented, and we don’t have any other process on climate change where that is the case. The developing countries have power in numbers at the COP that I am not sure they have in any other forum on climate change.”

Dr Alix Dietzel (fourth from right on the back row) at COP27

 

Is 1.5C still alive?

Colin: “The International Energy Agency expects fossil fuel demand to peak as early as 2025. However, with all countries harbouring exploitable fossil fuel resources racing to extract them (with our former Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Rees-Mogg vowing in September 2022 to “squeeze every last drop of oil” out of the North Sea) and key initiatives such as the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero failing to deliver on their promises, fossil fuels will not be phased out anytime soon.

“At the same time, pinning our hopes on Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is misguided as current capacities amount to four hours of global emissions and International Energy Agency projections suggest that capacities in 2030 will amount to 16 hours of emissions. This implies that in the absence of a sustained global financial commitment towards demand reduction or sustainable supply, limiting average global temperature rise to 1.5 above will be very difficult indeed.”

Rachel: “A key goal in Glasgow and in Sharm El Sheikh has been to keep 1.5°C alive. Some countries were attempting to backslide on mitigation goals during the final days, but in the end 1.5°C remained in the text. It’s disappointing that we didn’t see an increase in ambition from Glasgow, but 1.5°C is still there – even if “on life support”, as noted by Alok Sharma.

“It’s easy for us to do an academic analysis and speculate as to whether or not we think 1.5°C is politically feasible. But the IPCC has spelled it out clearly: every fraction of a degree of warming matters. What’s important is that we increase ambition to reduce emissions, and we phase out fossil fuels, so that we can limit global warming as much as possible.”

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This blog is written by Cabot Institute for the Environment members Dr Alix Dietzel, Dr Colin Nolden, Dr Rachel James and Amanda Woodman-Hardy.

Further reading

Read more about our experts at COP27.

Read Dr Alix Dietzel’s blog on COP27: how the fossil fuel lobby crowded out calls for climate justice

Read Dr Colin Nolden’s blog on After COP27: Is 1.5C still alive? 

Towards urban climate resilience: learning from Lusaka

 

“This is a long shot!”

These were the words used by Richard Jones (Science Fellow, Met Office) in August 2021 when he asked if I would consider leading a NERC proposal for a rapid six-month collaborative international research and scoping project, aligned to the COP26 Adaptation and Resilience theme. The deadline was incredibly tight but the opportunity was too good to pass up – we set to work!

Background to Lusaka and FRACTAL

Zambia’s capital city, Lusaka, is one of Africa’s fastest growing cities, with around 100,000 people in the early 1960s to more than 3 million people today. 70% of residents live in informal settlements and some areas are highly prone to flooding due to the low topography and highly permeable limestone sitting on impermeable bedrock, which gets easily saturated. When coupled with poor drainage and ineffective waste management, heavy rainfall events during the wet season (November to March) can lead to severe localised flooding impacting communities and creating serious health risks, such as cholera outbreaks. Evidence from climate change studies shows that heavy rainfall events are, in general, projected to increase in intensity over the coming decades (IPCC AR6, Libanda and Ngonga 2018). Addressing flood resilience in Lusaka is therefore a priority for communities and city authorities, and it became the focus of our proposal.

Lusaka was a focal city in the Future Resilience for African CiTies and Lands (FRACTAL) project funded jointly by NERC and DFID from 2015 to 2021. Led by the Climate System Analysis Group (CSAG) at the University of Cape Town, FRACTAL helped to improve scientific knowledge about regional climate in southern Africa and advance innovative engagement processes amongst researchers, practitioners, decision-makers and communities, to enhance the resilience of southern African cities in a changing climate. I was lucky enough to contribute to FRACTAL, exploring new approaches to climate data analysis (Daron et al., 2019) and climate risk communication (Jack et al., 2020), as well as taking part in engagements in Maputo, Mozambique – another focal city. At the end of FRACTAL there was a strong desire amongst partners to sustain relationships and continue collaborative research.

I joined the University of Bristol in April 2021 with a joint position through the Met Office Academic Partnership (MOAP). Motivated by the potential to grow my network, work across disciplines, and engage with experts at Bristol in climate impacts and risk research, I was excited about the opportunities ahead. So when Richard alerted me to the NERC call, it felt like an amazing opportunity to continue the work of FRACTAL and bring colleagues at the University of Bristol into the “FRACTAL family” – an affectionate term we use for the research team, which really has become a family from many years of working together.

Advancing understanding of flood risk through participatory processes

Working closely with colleagues at Bristol, University of Zambia, University of Cape Town, Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI – Oxford), Red Cross Climate Centre, and the Met Office, we honed a concept building on an idea from Chris Jack at CSAG to take a “deep dive” into the issues of flooding in Lusaka – an issue only partly explored in FRACTAL. Having already established effective relationships amongst those involved, and with high levels of trust and buy-in from key institutions in Lusaka (e.g., Lusaka City Council, Lusaka Water Security Initiative – LuWSI), it was far easier to work together and co-design the project; indeed the project conceived wouldn’t have been possible if starting from scratch. Our aim was to advance understanding of flood risk and solutions from different perspectives, and co-explore climate resilient development pathways that address the complex issue of flood risk in Lusaka, particularly in George and Kanyama compounds (informal settlements). The proposal centred on the use of participatory processes that enable different communities (researchers, local residents, city decision makers) to share and interrogate different types of knowledge, from scientific model datasets to lived experiences of flooding in vulnerable communities.

The proposal was well received and the FRACTAL-PLUS project started in October 2021, shortly before COP26; PLUS conveys how the project built upon FRACTAL but also stands for “Participatory climate information distillation for urban flood resilience in LUSaka”. The central concept of climate information distillation refers to the process of extracting meaning from multiple sources of information, through careful and open consideration of the assumptions, strengths and limitations in constructing the information.

The “Learning Lab” approach

Following an initial evidence gathering and dialogue phase at the end of 2021, we conducted two collaborative “Learning Labs” held in Lusaka in January and March 2022. Due to Covid-19, the first Learning Lab was held as a hybrid event on 26-27 January 2022. It was facilitated by the University of Zambia team with 20 in-person attendees including city stakeholders, the local project team and Richard Jones who was able to travel at short notice. The remainder of the project team joined via Zoom. Using interactive exercises, games (a great way to promote trust and exchange of ideas), presentations, and discussions on key challenges, the Lab helped unite participants to work together. I was amazed at the way participants threw themselves into the activities with such enthusiasm – in my experience, this kind of thing never happens when first engaging with people from different institutions and backgrounds. Yet because trust and relationships were already established, there was no apparent barrier to the engagement and dialogue. The Lab helped to further articulate the complexities of addressing flood risks in the city, and showed that past efforts – including expensive infrastructure investments – had done little to reduce the risks faced by many residents.

One of the highlights of the Labs, and the project overall, was the involvement of cartoon artist Bethuel Mangena, who developed a number of cartoons to support the process and extract meaning (in effect, distilling) the complicated and sensitive issues being discussed. The cartoon below was used to illustrate the purpose of the Lab, as a meeting place for ideas and conversations drawing on different sources of information (e.g., climate data, city plans and policies) and experiences of people from flood-affected communities. All of the cartoons generated in the project, including the feature image for this blog, are available in a Flickr cartoon gallery – well worth a look!

Image: Cartoon highlighting role of Learning Labs in FRACTAL-PLUS by Bethuel Mangena

Integrating scientific and experiential knowledge of flood risk

In addition to the Labs, desk-based work was completed to support the aims of the project. This included work by colleagues in Geographical Sciences at Bristol, Tom O’Shea and Jeff Neal, to generate high-resolution flood maps for Lusaka based on historic rainfall information and for future climate scenarios. In addition, Mary Zhang, now at the University of Oxford but in the School of Policy Studies at Bristol during the project, collaborated with colleagues at SEI-Oxford and the University of Zambia to design and conduct online and in-person surveys and interviews to elicit the lived experiences of flooding from residents in George and Kanyama, as well as experiences of those managing flood risks in the city authorities. This work resulted in new information and knowledge, such as the relative perceived roles of climate change and flood management approaches in the levels of risk faced, that was further interrogated in the second Learning Lab.

Thanks to a reduction in covid risk, the second lab was able to take place entirely in person. Sadly I was unable to travel to Lusaka for the Lab, but the decision to remove the virtual element and focus on in-person interactions helped further promote active engagement amongst city decision-makers, researchers and other participants, and ultimately better achieve the goals of the Lab. Indeed the project helped us learn the limits of hybrid events. Whilst I remain a big advocate for remote technology, the project showed it can be far more productive to have solely in-person events where everyone is truly present.

The second Lab took place at the end of March 2022. In addition to Lusaka participants and members of the project team, we were also joined by the Mayor of Lusaka, Ms. Chilando Chitangala. As well as demonstrating how trusted and respected our partners in Lusaka are, the attendance of the mayor showed the commitment of the city government to addressing climate risks in Lusaka. We were extremely grateful for her time engaging in the discussions and sharing her perspectives.

During the lab the team focused on interrogating all of the evidence available, including the new understanding gained through the project from surveys, interviews, climate and flood data analysis, towards collaboratively mapping climate resilient development pathways for the city. The richness and openness in the discussions allowed progress to be made, though it remains clear that addressing flood risk in informal settlements in Lusaka is an incredibly challenging endeavour.

Photo: Participants at March 2022 Learning Lab in Lusaka

What did we achieve?

The main outcomes from the project include:

  1. Enabling co-exploration of knowledge and information to guide city officials (including the mayor – see quote below) in developing Lusaka’s new integrated development plan.
  2. Demonstrating that flooding will be an ongoing issue even if current drainage plans are implemented, with projections of more intense rainfall over the 21st century pointing to the need for more holistic, long-term and potentially radical solutions.
  3. A plan to integrate flood modelling outputs into the Lusaka Water Security Initiative (LuWSI) digital flood atlas for Lusaka.
  4. Sustaining relationships between FRACTAL partners and building new links with researchers at Bristol to enable future collaborations, including input to a new proposal in development for a multi-year follow-on to FRACTAL.
  5. A range of outputs, including contributing to a FRACTAL “principles” paper (McClure et al., 2022) supporting future participatory projects.

It has been such a privilege to lead the FRACTAL-PLUS project. I’m extremely grateful to the FRACTAL family for trusting me to lead the project, and for the input from colleagues at Bristol – Jeff Neal, Tom O’Shea, Rachel James, Mary Zhang, and especially Lauren Brown who expertly managed the project and guided me throughout.

I really hope I can visit Lusaka in the future. The city has a special place in my heart, even if I have only been there via Zoom!

“FRACTAL-PLUS has done well to zero in on the issue of urban floods and how climate change pressures are making it worse. The people of Lusaka have continually experienced floods in various parts of the city. While the problem is widespread, the most affected people remain to be those in informal settlements such as George and Kanyama where climate change challenges interact with poor infrastructure, poor quality housing and poorly managed solid waste.” Mayor Ms. Chilando Chitangala, 29 March 2022

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This blog is written by Dr Joe Daron, Senior Research Fellow, Faculty of Science, University of Bristol;
Science Manager, International Climate Services, Met Office; and Cabot Institute for the Environment member.
Find out more about Joe’s research at https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/persons/joe-daron.

 

COP27: how the fossil fuel lobby crowded out calls for climate justice

COP27 has just wrapped up. Despite much excitement over a new fund to address “loss and damage” caused by climate change, there is also anger about perceived backsliding on commitments to lower emissions and phase out fossil fuels.

As an academic expert in climate justice who went along this year, hoping to make a difference, I share this anger.

“Together for Implementation” was the message as COP27 got underway on November 6 and some 30,000 people descended on the Egyptian resort town of Sharm El Sheik. The UNFCCC strictly regulates who can attend negotiations. Parties (country negotiation teams), the media and observers (NGOs, IGOs and UN special agencies) must all be pre-approved.

I went along as an NGO observer, to represent the University of Bristol Cabot Institute for the Environment. Observers have access to the main plenaries and ceremonies, the pavilion exhibition spaces and side events. The negotiation rooms, however, are largely off limits. Most of the day is spent listening to speeches, networking and asking questions at side-events.

Woman sits in large conference room
The author at the COP27 opening plenary.
Colin Nolden, Author provided

The main role of observers, then, is to apply indirect pressure on negotiators, report on what is happening and network. Meaningful impact on and participation in negotiations seems out of reach for many of the passionate people I met.

Who does – and doesn’t – get a say

It has long been known that who gets a say in climate change governance is skewed. As someone working on fair decision making as part of a just transition to less carbon-intensive lifestyles and a climate change-adapted society, it is clear that only the most powerful voices are reflected in treaties such as the Paris Agreement. At last year’s COP26, men spoke 74% of the time, indigenous communities faced language barriers and racism and those who could not obtain visas were excluded entirely.

Despite being advertised as “Africa’s COP”, COP27 further hampered inclusion. The run up was dogged by accusations of inflated hotel prices and concerns over surveillance, and warnings about Egypt’s brutal police state. The right to protest was limited, with campaigners complaining of intimidation and censorship.

Conference area with 'AfricaCOP27' sign
Africa’s COP?
Alix Dietzel, Author provided

Arriving in Sharm El Sheik, there was an air of intimidation starting at the airport, where military personnel scrutinised passports. Police roadblocks featured heavily on our way to the hotel and military officials surrounded the COP venue the next morning.

Inside the venue, there were rumours we were being watched and observers were urged not to download the official app. More minor issues included voices literally not being heard due to unreliable microphones and the constant drone of aeroplanes overhead, and a scarcity of food with queues sometimes taking an hour or more. Sponsored by Coca Cola, it was also difficult to access water to refill our bottles. We were sold soft drinks instead.

Outside of the venue, unless I was with a male colleague, I faced near constant sexual harassment, hampering my ability to come and go from the summit. All these issues, major and minor, affect who is able to contribute at COP.

Fossil fuel interests dominated

In terms of numbers, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) registered the largest party delegation with more than 1,000 people. The oil and gas-rich nation of just 9 million people had a delegation almost twice the size of the next biggest, Brazil. More troublingly, the oil and gas lobby representatives were registered in the national delegations of 29 different countries and were larger than any single national delegation (outside of the UAE). According to one NGO, at least 636 of those attending COP27 were lobbyists for the fossil-fuel industry.

Large oil tanker goes past city skyline
The UAE has some of the world’s largest reserves of both oil and gas.
Nick Fox / shutterstock

Despite the promise that COP27 would foreground African interests, the fossil lobby outnumbers any delegation from Africa. These numbers give a sense of who has power and say at these negotiations, and who does not.

Protecting the petrostates

The main outcomes of COP27 are a good illustration of the power dynamics at play. There is some good news on loss and damage, which was added to the agenda at the last moment. Nearly 200 countries agreed that a fund for loss and damage, which would pay out to rescue and rebuild the physical and social infrastructure of countries ravaged by extreme weather events, should be set up within the next year. However, there is no agreement yet on how much money should be paid in, by whom, and on what basis.

Much more worryingly, there had been a push to phase out all fossil fuels by countries including some of the biggest producers: the EU, Australia, India, Canada, the US and Norway. However, with China, Russia, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Iran pushing back, several commitments made at COP26 in Glasgow were dropped, including a target for global emissions to peak by 2025. The outcome was widely judged a failure on efforts to cut emissions: the final agreed text from the summit makes no mention of phasing out fossil fuels and scant reference to the 1.5℃ target.

Laurence Tubiana, one of the architects of the Paris Agreement, blamed the host country, Egypt, for allowing its regional alliances to sway the final decision, producing a text that clearly protects oil and gas petrostates and the fossil fuel industries.

The final outcomes demonstrate that, despite the thousands who were there to advocate for climate justice, it was the fossil fuel lobby that had most influence. As a climate justice scholar, I am deeply worried about the processes at COPs, especially given next year’s destination: Dubai. It remains to be seen what happens with the loss and damage fund, but time is running out and watered down commitments on emissions are at this stage deeply unjust and frankly dangerous.The Conversation

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This blog is written by Cabot Institute for the Environment member Dr Alix Dietzel, Senior Lecturer in Climate Justice, University of BristolThis article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Are you a journalist looking for climate experts? We’ve got you covered

We’ve got lots of media trained climate change experts. If you need an expert for an interview, here is a list of Caboteers you can approach. All media enquiries should be made via Victoria Tagg, our dedicated Media and PR Manager at the University of Bristol. Email victoria.tagg@bristol.ac.uk or call +44 (0)117 428 2489.

Climate change / climate emergency / climate science / climate-induced disasters

Dr Eunice Lo – expert in changes in extreme weather events such as heatwaves and cold spells, and how these changes translate to negative health outcomes including illnesses and deaths. Follow on Twitter @EuniceLoClimate.

Professor Daniela Schmidt – expert in the causes and effects of climate change on marine systems. Dani is also a Lead Author on the IPCC reports.

Dr Vikki Thompson – expert on climate extremes, particularly heat extremes. Follow on Twitter @ClimateVikki

Dr Katerina Michalides – expert in drylands, drought and desertification and helping East African rural communities to adapt to droughts and future climate change. Follow on Twitter @_kmichaelides.

Professor Dann Mitchell – expert in how climate change alters the atmospheric circulation, extreme events, and impacts on human health. Dann is also a Met Office Chair. Follow on Twitter @ClimateDann.

Professor Dan Lunt – expert on past climate change, with a focus on understanding how and why climate has changed in the past and what we can learn about the future from the past. Dan is also a Lead Author on IPCC AR6. Follow on Twitter @ClimateSamwell.

Professor Jonathan Bamber – expert on the impact of melting land ice on sea level rise (SLR) and the response of the ocean to changes in freshwater forcing. Follow on Twitter @jlbamber

Professor Paul Bates CBE – expert in the science of flooding, risk and reducing threats to life and economic losses worldwide. Follow on Twitter @paul_d_bates

Professor Tony Payne – expert in the effects of climate change on earth systems and glaciers.

Dr Matt Palmer – expert in sea level and ocean heat content research at the Met Office Hadley Centre and University of Bristol. Follow on Twitter @mpclimate.

Net Zero / Energy / Renewables

Professor Valeska Ting – Engineer and expert in net zero, low carbon technologies, low carbon energy and flying. Also an accomplished STEM communicator, is an BAME Expert Voice for the BBC Academy. Follow on Twitter @ProfValeskaTing.

Professor Philip Taylor – Expert in net zero, energy systems, energy storage, utilities, electric power distribution. Also Pro-Vice Chancellor at the University of Bristol. Follow on Twitter @rolyatlihp.

Dr Colin Nolden – expert in sustainable energy policyregulation and business models and interactions with secondary markets such as carbon markets and other sectors such as mobility. Colin will be at COP27. Colin will be in attendance in the Blue Zone at COP27.

Professor Charl Faul – expert in novel functional materials for sustainable energy applications e.g. in CO2 capture and conversion and energy storage devices.  Follow on Twitter @Charl_FJ_Faul.

Climate finance

Dr Rachel James – Expert in climate finance, damage, loss and decision making. Also has expertise in African climate systems and contemporary and future climate change. Follow on Twitter @_RachelJames. Rachel will be in attendance in the Blue Zone at COP27.

Climate justice

Dr Alix Dietzel – climate justice and climate policy expert. Focusing on the global and local scale and interested in how just the response to climate change is and how we can ensure a just transition. Alix will be at COP27. Follow on Twitter @alixdietzel. Alix will be in attendance in the Blue Zone at COP27.

Dr Ed Atkins – expert on environmental and energy policy, politics and governance and how they must be equitable and inclusive. Also interested in local politics of climate change policies and energy generation and consumption. Follow on Twitter @edatkins_.

Climate activism / Extinction Rebellion

Dr Oscar Berglund – expert on climate change activism and particularly Extinction Rebellion (XR) and the use of civil disobedience. Follow on Twitter @berglund_oscar.

Air pollution / Greenhouse gases

Dr Aoife Grant – expert in greenhouse gases and methane. Set up a monitoring station at Glasgow for COP26 to record emissions.

Professor Matt Rigby – expert on sources and sinks of greenhouse gases and ozone depleting substances. Follow on Twitter @TheOtherMRigby.

Land, nature and food

Viola Heinrich – expert in emissions and climate mitiagion potential within the land use sector in the tropics, especially the Brazilian Amazon. IPCC author. Follow on Twitter @vh_trees.
Dr Jo House – expert on land and climate interactions, including emissions of carbon dioxide from land use change (e.g. deforestation), climate mitigation potential from the land (e.g. afforestationbioenergy), and implications of science for policy. Previously Government Office for Science’s Head of Climate Advice. Follow on Twitter @Drjohouse.
Dr Taro Takahashi – expert on farminglivestock production systems as well as progamme evaluation and general equilibrium modelling of pasture and livestock-based economies.
Dr Maria Paula Escobar-Tello – expert on tensions and intersections between livestock farming and the environment.

Climate change and infrastructure

Dr Maria Pregnolato – expert on effects of climate change and flooding on infrastructure. Follow on Twitter @MariaPregnolat1.

Plastic and the environment

Dr Charlotte Lloyd – expert on the fate of chemicals in the terrestrial environment, including plasticsbioplastics and agricultural wastes. Follow on Twitter @DrCharlLloyd.

Climate change and health

Dr Dan O’Hare – expert in climate anxiety and educational psychologist. Follow on Twitter @edpsydan.

Cabot Institute for the Environment at COP27

We will have three academics in attendance at the Blue Zone at COP27. These are:
Dr Alix Dietzel, Dr Rachel James and Dr Colin Nolden. All are media-trained and feature in the list above.

Read more about COP on our website at https://bristol.ac.uk/cabot/what-we-do/projects/cop/

Watch our Cabot Conversations – 10 conversations between 2 experts on a climate change issue, all whilst an artist listens in the background and interprets the conversation into a beautiful piece of art in real time. Find out more at bristol.ac.uk/cabot/conversations.
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This blog was written by Amanda Woodman-Hardy, Communications and Engagement Officer at the Cabot Institute for the Environment. Follow on Twitter @Enviro_Mand and @cabotinstitute.

Climate change will not impact everyone the same way; but we do not know how

The National Guard rescuing a flood victim. Credit The National Guard, Flickr, CC BY 2.0.

Climate change is affecting the lives of billions of people. The impacts range from water scarcity and food production to health and wellbeing. Climate change impacts are felt in the cities and settlements where people live. We have heard many times that we need to ensure no one is left behind in climate change adaptation and mitigation. To ensure that every voice matters, the impacts of climate change on different groups have to be taken into account. Many individuals or groups are disproportionately affected by climate change as they have less capacity to prepare for, respond to, and recover from climate-related hazards. Worldwide, there are more than one billion persons with disabilities, 15% of the world’s population. The preamble of the Paris Agreement states that parties should respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights and the rights of persons with disabilities, when taking action to address climate change.

Hence, IPCC working group II (WGII) 6th assessment report which was released earlier this year emphasizes not only the warming, drought and floods, but also how much we are exposed to these hazards. There is a renewed focus on vulnerability to climate change which varies strongly between regions and groups of people.

Germany currently holds the G7 presidency, an inter-governmental political forum consisting of several large global north industrial nations. The German Federal Government Commissioner for the Interests of the Disabled called for an Inclusion summit, the first of its kind, in September in Berlin. The main aim was to address questions around impacts of COVID-19, Artificial Intelligence, and climate change on persons with disabilities.

I have never before taken part in such an event, and it was a steep learning curve. Not only were there bilateral meetings between nations, but also the Internal Disability Alliance (IDA), had bilateral meetings with the academics who were invited to speak. The presentations were translated to international sign language, subtitled, and we implemented guidance to make these more accessible. Presenting to a group where many of the participants had visual impairments is different to the typical presentations a natural scientist is focusing on.

The climate change research was presented by Sebastien Jodoin (from McGill) and myself. Sebastien focused on the lack of inclusion of disability rights in the climate emergency. Fewer than one in four countries mentioned disabled people in their national climate plans. My contribution focused on pointing out the lack of knowledge on impacts of and adaptation to climate change in the context of persons with disability. The limited research in the climate change context focusses on heat and other extreme events. Vulnerability to climate change of persons with disabilities is not covered in the literature and therefore not assessed in the report. Disability is therefore only discussed as a category of vulnerability, as part of lists of old people, young people, marginalized and disabled. But these groups have different challenges and vulnerabilities.

So what was the outcome? IDA emphasized the importance of inclusion as a driver for change. The Chairs summary emphasized the importance of comprehensive statistical and research data to inform the design of policy aiming to identify and address barriers faced by persons with disabilities in exercising their rights.

Environmental justice ensures that socially vulnerable segments of the population should not be disproportionately affected by adverse environmental impacts or hazards. Often actions start at a local scale. In Bristol the Bristol Disability and Equality Forum is working towards inclusion on the city scale, based on their community climate action plan. Emma Green, their climate action coordinator, helped me to consider costs and benefits of climate adaptation more broadly than I did before. Environmental justice asks us all to make sure we consider the needs of everyone while we adapt to and mitigate to climate change. Subregional disaggregation will allow us to determine groups who have the information, skills and funds to implement climate adaptation and reduce their vulnerability, and those who will need support.

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This blog is written by Cabot Institute for the Environment member Professor Daniela Schmidt, School of Earth Sciences, University of Bristol. Daniela is an IPCC report lead author and lead on the recent IPCC WGII chapter on Europe.

Professor Daniela Schmidt